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HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: 
ADDED VALUE TO PACIFIC ISLAND STATES 
 
MARGARETHA WEWERINKE AND FITILAGI FA’ANUNU * 
  
 
                                  We’re not talking about the growth [of] GDP, we’re not talking about what it means  
                                 in terms of profit and losses of the large corporations, we’re talking about our survival. 
             Anote Tong, President of Kiribati1  
 
 
Climate change is often referred to as the defining challenge of our time, and it is well known that 
Pacific Island States are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Indeed, 
these adverse effects are already very tangible for most communities across the region. Coastal 
features are visibly changing, with rising sea-levels, higher king tides and storm surges, saltwater 
intrusion and changing weather patterns posing an increasing threat to the livelihoods of Pacific 
Island communities. The threats are amplified by extreme weather events becoming more intense 
and more damaging as a result of climate change, with Cyclone Pam recently causing loss of human 
life and catastrophic damage in Vanuatu, and to a lesser extent in the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and 
Kiribati. 2  While communities and governments—assisted by regional, international and non-
governmental organisations—are proactively building resilience and adapting to climate change, 
there is a real risk of much more severe and damaging impacts materialising in the coming 
decades.3 The threats are so severe that most, if not all, Pacific Island States face the threat of losing 
some or all of their habitable territory as a result of climate change, with related risks of the loss of 
traditional livelihoods and large-scale involuntary displacement.4 
 
This Special Issue of the Journal of South Pacific Law aims to provide insight into the role of 
international law in addressing the short-term and long-term challenges posed by climate change to 
Pacific Island States and their populations. It focuses on the two international legal frameworks that 
were designed to protect the Earth’s climate system and the human person: international climate 
change law on the one hand, and international human rights law on the other. These two 
frameworks contain lofty principles with moral, political and indeed legal significance: the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted to ‘prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system [...] within a timeframe sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food security is not threatened’.5 
International human rights law, on the other hand, aims to protect the human person against 
preventable interferences with a range of rights, and to provide victims of human rights violations 
                                                
* Dr. Margaretha Wewerinke is a lecturer in environmental law at the University of the South Pacific (USP) School of 
Law in Vanuatu. Fitilagi Fa’anunu is a Law Practitioner in Tonga and a Master of Environmental Law Candidate at 
USP. 
1 Interview with Radio Australia’s Pacific Beat, 13 June 2014, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-
13/pacific-presidents/5521478 (accessed 29 October 2015). 
2 As discussed in detail by Calvy Aonima and Shivanal Kumar in their contribution to this Special Issue. 
3 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report (CUP, 2014) 67 
(stating that some small island States ‘are expected to face very high impacts that could have associated damage and 
adaptation costs of several percentage points of gross domestic product’). 
4 Ibid 65. 
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 
(entered into force 19 June 1993) (UNFCCC), Article 2. 
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that have occurred with adequate and effective remedies.6 It is important to note that Pacific Island 
States first started raising concerns about climate change at international human rights forums more 
than a decade ago.7 This has not, of yet, resulted in the action and international cooperation needed 
to prevent climate change-induced interferences with human rights.  
 
Understanding how the UNFCCC and international human rights law currently support Pacific 
Island States and local communities in the struggle against climate change is key to ensuring 
effective responses. In this regard, a key point to note is that existing international law not only 
requires that action to address the threats posed by climate change is effective, but also that it is 
equitable. The Nobel Peace Prize winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
stated unequivocally in numerous reports that human activities that produce greenhouse gases--
especially the burning of fossil fuels--are the primary cause of climate change.8 We also know that 
the impacts of climate change that are being experienced today can be traced back to greenhouse 
gas-emitting activities that have fuelled the development of what are now high-income States.9 
Their contributions to global emission stocks are in sharp contrast to those of Pacific Island States, 
which amount to less than 0.03% of the total.10 The region’s contribution to emission flows remains 
extremely low.11  
 
The disparities in responsibility for climate change and capacity to address it have both practical 
and legal implications for climate change action. Practically speaking, a result of the economic 
benefits reaped from high-carbon industrialisation, developed States still have the greatest capacity 
for (i) making deep cuts in their domestic emissions of greenhouse gases; and (ii) supporting 
developing States in achieving a transition to sustainable and inclusive development.12 For this 
reason, the UNFCCC prescribes climate action in accordance with the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDRRC). 13  More specifically, the 
UNFCCC requires that developed States take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse 
effects thereof, including by sharing technologies and providing financial support to developing 
states in a manner that promotes the right to sustainable development.14 The UNFCCC also requires 
developed States to support developing States in building local capacities,15 and to provide finance 
for adaptation in developing States that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change.16  
 
                                                
6 See, for example, Airey v Republic of Ireland (1979) 305 Eur Court HR (ser A) 2 [32] (where the European Court of 
Human Rights found that the provisions of human rights treaties should be interpreted and applied in a way that makes 
its safeguards practical and effective). 
7 See, for example, Initial Report of Kiribati under the Convention on the Rights of the Child submitted to the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/KIR/1 (7 December 2005).  
8 See, for example, IPCC (2014), above n 3, 40.  
9 Ibid 44. See also Climate and Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), (2014), The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report: What’s in it for Small Island Developing States? 6 http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/IPCC-AR5-
Whats-in-it-for-SIDS_WEB.pdf (accessed 23 November 2015). 
10 Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), (2014), Climate Change 
https://www.sprep.org/international/climate-change (accessed 23 November 2015). See also the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, (2015), The Pacific Region 1 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/2015/media/pacific.pdf (accessed 23 November 2015). 
11 SPREP, (2014), above n 10. 
12  CDKN (2014), above n 9, 28. 
13  UNFCCC, Preamble and Article 3(1). 
14 UNFCCC, Article 3(1), 3(4), 4(4) and 4(5). 
15 UNFCCC, Article 4(5) and 5. 
16 UNFCCC, Article 4(3).  
 E-3  
The contributions to this Special Issue demonstrate, amongst other things, that international human 
rights law underscores rather than replaces the need for compliance with the principle of CBDRRC 
and the above-mentioned obligations: non-compliance with these obligations not only increases the 
threats to the enjoyment of human rights caused by the adverse effects of climate change, but also 
perpetuates historical inequities that continue to hamper the full and non-discriminatory realisation 
of human rights across the globe. As international human rights law is based on the premise that all 
human beings are equal in dignity and rights, action to correct, rather than perpetuate, historical 
inequities is required. This mutually reinforcing nature of UNFCCC principles and commitments 
and human rights obligations is apparent from all contributions to this Special Issue.  
 
This Special Issue is launched ahead of the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) 
from 30 November to 11 December 2015 in Paris.17 As the contributing authors demonstrate, the 
inter-relationship between climate change law and human rights law has important implications for 
negotiations towards a new legally binding agreement under the UNFCCC, which is expected to be 
adopted at COP21. At the same time, however, the comprehensive legal framework discussed in 
this Special Issue is comprised of existing international laws. As such, it could be relied upon by 
Pacific Island States and beneficiaries of human rights obligations in legal action outside the 
UNFCCC process, including in climate change litigation. This realisation is important as it signals 
the existence of multiple strategies to address climate change through the invocation of international 
laws; a reality that could inform Pacific Island States’ negotiating positions and strategies.  
 
Each of the contributions to the Special Issue sheds light on a different aspect of the UNFCCC, 
international human rights law and/or the inter-relationship between these frameworks. The first 
article by Dr. Curtis Doebbler, ‘Ensuring Consistency with Existing International Law of Another 
Climate Change Agreement’, provides insight into legal challenges arising in the context of 
negotiations to strengthen ambition in the pre-2020 period and to agree on a new climate change 
agreement under the UNFCCC that would enter into force in 2020. The latter agreement is expected 
to replace parts of the Kyoto Protocol—which sets legally binding quantified emission reduction 
targets for developed country Parties—and contribute to the implementation of the UNFCCC. 
Doebbler analyses the Draft Agreement and accompanying Draft Decision that form the basis for 
negotiations under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) 
in Paris, focusing on the key elements of the COP21 outcome: (1) the Preamble; (2) Definitions 
(Art. 1); (3) General (Art. 2 and 2bis); (4) Mitigation (Art. 3); (5) Adaptation and loss and damage 
(Arts. 4 and 5); Finance (Art. 6); Capacity building (Art. 8 and 8bis); (9) Transparency (Art. 9); (10) 
Timeframes and implementation (Arts. 10 and 11); (11) Procedures, institutions and decision-
making (Arts. 12-15 and 22) and Other provisions (Arts. 16-21 and 23-26). Although the structure 
of the Draft Agreement resembles that of a treaty, its draft provisions remain more of a compilation 
of options reflecting the widely diverging views of States than a blueprint for a new treaty. Hereby, 
many articles include ‘no text’ options or options that would, when adopted and implemented, be 
insufficient to achieve the full, effective and sustained implementation of the UNFCCC itself. 
Moreover, the texts contain options that seem aimed at blurring the distinction between developed 
and developing States, which could undermine both the fairness and the effectiveness of the climate 
change regime. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that even the reiteration of existing principles 
has become controversial, as is clear from brackets around a provision in the ‘Purpose’ section of 
the Draft Agreement (Art. 2) that highlights the principle of CBDR; the (bracketed) addition of ‘in 
                                                
17 See COP Decision 1/CP.17, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 2012), establishing a negotiation process 
with a mandate to “develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
Convention applicable to all Parties.” COP21 also serves as the 11th Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP11). 
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the light of national circumstances’; a bracketed reference to ‘the principles and provisions of the 
Convention’; and a ‘no text’ option for this same article.18  
 
As far as human rights are concerned, it is worth recalling that the link between climate change and 
human rights has been recognised in a series of resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council, all of 
which build on the recognition that climate change ‘poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to 
people and communities around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human 
rights’.19 The link between climate change and human rights has also been set out in an analytical 
report produced by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) at the 
request of the Council20; and in statements and press releases from human rights treaty bodies.21 
Moreover, all 194 State Parties to the UNFCCC acknowledged in a 2010 decision of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) that ‘States should, in all climate change-related actions, fully 
respect human rights’.22 However, the references to human rights in the operative part of the Draft 
Agreement are all bracketed—indicating a lack of consensus on their inclusion. In his discussion of 
cross-cutting issues in the Draft Agreement, Doebbler attributes this lack of consensus to a division 
amongst States between two human rights visions, with the first emphasising participatory civil and 
political rights and the second insisting on a broader perspective that includes economic, social and 
cultural rights and the right to development. 23 This division is just one out of many that would need 
to be overcome in order to achieve an outcome in Paris that is fully consistent with existing 
international law. More generally, the draft Agreement and Decision reflect a risk that the Paris 
outcome could downgrade and weaken existing international laws rather than strengthening and 
implementing it. 
 
Following Doebbler’s analysis of the Draft Agreement and Draft Decision, Calvy Aonima and 
Shivanal Kumar provide a comprehensive analysis of the potential implications under international 
law of Cyclone Pam, a category 5 cyclone which hit Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Solomon 
Islands in March 2015. As mentioned above, Vanuatu was particularly badly affected, as the 
cyclone—dubbed ‘a monster’ by Vanuatu’s President Baldwin Lonsdale—claimed at least 15 
human lives, destroyed thousands of homes, crippled much of Vanuatu’s infrastructure and left 
some of the outer islands almost completely without food sources. The estimated damage and loss 
caused to Vanuatu’s social, infrastructural and economic sectors exceeds $US443 million, 
equivalent to around 64% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).24 For meeting these 
costs, Vanuatu relied primarily on its own resources, supplemented by humanitarian aid provided 
by other governments and non-governmental organisations on a charitable basis.    
 
                                                
18 Draft Agreement and Draft Decision on Workstreams 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action (ADP): Work of the ADP Contact Group (edited version of 6 November 2015).  
19 Human Rights and Climate Change, UN Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23, UN Doc A/HRC/7/78 (14 July 
2008). 
20 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship between 
Climate Change and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/10/61 (15 January 2009). 
21 See, for example, Statement of the CEDAW Committee on Gender and Climate Change, adopted at 44th mtg, NY (7 
August 2009). 
22 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, Decision 1/CP.15 (2010), para. 8. The UNFCCC has since been 
ratified by South Sudan, which brings the number of state parties to 195. 
23 Curtis Doebbler, ‘Ensuring Consistency with Existing International Law of Another Climate Change Agreement’ 
(2015) 1 JSPL, n 172-176 and accompanying text. 
24 See Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, Supporting Resilient Recovery in Vanuatu after Cyclone 
Pam (2015), available at https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/Vanuatu_SoI.pdf (accessed 22 November 
2015). 
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This factual situation offers a case study to examine the relevance of existing international climate 
change law for Pacific Island States that are already feeling the effects of dangerous climate change. 
The most pertinent question here is whether Vanuatu would have legal grounds under international 
law to claim reparations for the loss and damage caused by Cyclone Pam from a State or States that 
indirectly contributed to this damage. This question is particularly relevant in light of ongoing 
negotiations on a framework for addressing Loss and Damage under the UNFCCC, as it involves 
the important question of whether Pacific Island States already have a right to reparations for 
climate change-induced loss and damage under international law, irrespective of provisions on Loss 
and Damage that might be included in a new Agreement under the UNFCCC. Aonima and Kumar 
suggest that the answer to these questions is affirmative. Following an explanation of the correlation 
between Cyclone Pam and climate change, the two authors discuss how the UNFCCC itself, as 
existing international law, can already be used as a legal basis for a State responsibility claim 
against one or several States that have made material contributions to the accumulated emissions in 
the global atmosphere. It is legally significant that these emission stocks have in turn increased the 
likelihood that ‘super cyclones’ such as Cyclone Pam may occur. However, there are significant 
obstacles to enforcing the right to reparations for internationally wrongful acts that indirectly led to 
Cyclone Pam. Aonima and Kumar note that there are several avenues to invoke State responsibility, 
each of which might have its own obstacles, but focus their analysis on the possibility of bringing a 
contentious case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For Vanuatu, one of the greatest 
obstacles to bringing a case before the ICJ is that Vanuatu has not recognised the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ as compulsory. Accordingly, Aonima and Kumar recommend that Vanuatu—and any State in a 
similar position—makes a declaration to recognise the jurisdiction of the ICJ as compulsory in 
order to overcome this obstacle.  
 
The potential relevance of climate change litigation under international law  is also apparent from 
Fitilagi Fa’anunu’s contribution, ‘A Breach of Fundamental Rights as the Legal Basis for 
Reparations for Climate Change Damages and Injuries under International Law: Case Study of 
Ha’apai Islands (Tonga) Following Cyclone Ian’. This article draws on the legal implications of 
Cyclone Ian, which hit Tonga in January 2014 and affected the communities of the small Ha’apai 
Islands in particular.  These communities maintain a distinct cultural identity and rely primarily on 
subsistence agriculture and fishing for sustenance. Fa’anunu sets out to demonstrate how these 
communities can rely on international human rights law to secure remedies for the loss and damage 
suffered as a result of Cyclone Ian.  
 
Mirroring the discussion of the link between Cyclone Pam and climate change by Aonima and 
Kumar, Fa’anunu first sets out how Cyclone Ian can be attributed to climate change from a factual 
and a legal human rights perspective. Her contribution demonstrates how Cyclone Ian has interfered 
with a range of human rights to which the Ha’apai communities are entitled, including the right to 
life, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to food, the right to health, and the right to 
self-determination. As these rights are legally entrenched in a range of treaties which States have 
voluntarily signed and ratified, as well as in customary international law, it is virtually undisputed 
that these rights give rise to legal obligations for all States under international law. However, there 
is insufficient attention for the inter-relationship between these obligations on the one hand and 
obligations under the UNFCCC on the other. Fa’anunu takes the position that human rights 
obligations reinforce the provisions under the UNFCCC that are aimed at preventing dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Both legal frameworks provide a legal basis for 
State responsibility claims for internationally wrongful conduct that has contributed to climate 
change damage. Apart from adding an important moral dimension, international human rights law 
adds value to climate change law by recognising individuals and peoples as beneficiaries of 
international obligations. The rights of individuals (and, in some instances, peoples) could be 
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enforced by States on their behalf. However, members of the Ha’apai communities also have access 
to international human rights mechanisms, such as the Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights 
Council, to raise concerns about interferences with human rights resulting from Cyclone Ian or 
other extreme weather events attributable to climate change. 
 
While observing that climate change already causes human rights violations, we must recall that 
manifestations of climate change that are being experienced today are the result of a mere 0.85°C of 
warming since pre-industrialisation.25 The contribution of Dr. Flavia Bustreo, ‘Health and Our 
Shared Responsibility to Deal With Climate Change: a WHO Perspective’ underscores the need for 
urgent action, in accordance with the precautionary principle enshrined in Article 3 of the 
UNFCCC, to prevent even more pervasive and severe effects of climate change in the coming 
decades. This imperative for action also follows from international human rights law: as Bustreo 
points out, an overwhelming body of evidence suggests that climate change has adverse effects on 
the enjoyment of the right to the highest attainable standard of health. The most vulnerable 
segments of populations are most severely affected. As developing countries that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, Pacific Island States bear a disproportionate 
burden of these health impacts, while being most likely to lack the resources to adequately address 
these impacts.  
 
Bustreo’s contribution is a strong call for a response to climate change that is grounded in human 
rights standards, including the right to the highest attainable standard of health. Noting that the right 
to health is protected under the constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO) and a range 
of human rights treaties, she explains how the WHO can serve as a forum for action on health and 
climate change. Much like human rights, health is a cross-cutting issue in the negotiations under the 
UNFCCC which has its own expert forum for discussion and action. And while the UNFCCC is the 
central forum for international action on climate change, utilising the expertise of forums and 
mechanisms focused specifically on health and human rights is paramount to ensuring that 
individual and joint climate action is taken in accordance with human rights standards, including the 
right to health. One step that could be taken at COP21 in Paris is to include explicit references to 
the right to health in the Purpose and Adaptation sections of the Paris Agreement, in a manner that 
demonstrates States’ shared commitment to make health a priority in responses to climate change. 
As Bustreo notes, prioritising health requires mobilising adequate resources to address the adverse 
effects of climate change on the right to health, with specific attention to the most vulnerable. There 
is also a need to recognise the synergies between different sectors that help build people’s resilience 
to deal with the increased shocks and disease exposure resulting from climate change. This brings 
us back to the need for equitable responses to climate change that promote, rather than undermine, 
the realisation of the right to sustainable development in Pacific Island States and across the globe.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                
25 IPCC, ‘Contribution of Working Group I to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report’ in Thomas F Stocker et al (eds), 
Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis (CUP 2013) 12. 
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ENSURING CONSISTENCY WITH EXISTING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF ANOTHER CLIMATE CHANGE AGREEMENT 
 
CURTIS DOEBBLER* 
 
 
                           We in the Pacific are innocent bystanders in the greatest act of folly of any age.  
                      Unless the world acts decisively in the coming weeks, the Pacific as we know it is doomed. 
                        Fiji Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Climate change is perhaps the greatest threat facing humanity and the planet Earth today and it is 
likely to remain so until human beings take adequate action to address the adverse effects of climate 
change. Such action can only be taken jointly. Even if every Pacific Island State took several times 
the action each has capacity to take in terms of mitigation and adaptation, it would have little 
impact on the adverse effects of climate change for these States in the medium and long-term. Some 
of the most vulnerable States in the world are simply unable to protect the most fundamental human 
rights of their people without assistance and action by the States that have been disproportionately 
exploiting the atmosphere for centuries. To achieve the needed action States have entered into a 
legally binding treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),2 
which has been ratified by more States than the Charter of the United Nations. This treaty sets out 
the basic contours of the needed action and provides legal obligations to address climate change in 
accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities (CBDRRC). However, as it lacks a mechanism for enforcement, its implementation 
remains dependent on the will of States.3 Unlike some other processes,4 time is of the essence. The 
global efforts to address climate change are fighting a ticking clock set in motion by nature.  
 
After more than half a decade of discussions, negotiations began in October 2015 on a new climate 
change agreement to complement and replace provisions of the Kyoto Protocol5 and to enhance the 
UNFCCC. The current text6 (“Draft Agreement” or “23 October text”) of this new treaty and the 
accompanying decisions of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC (the main one 
referred to here as the “Draft COP21 Decision”) will be worked on during the first week of COP21 
                                                
* Dr. Curtis Doebbler is an international human rights lawyer; visiting professor of law at the University of Makeni in 
Sierra Leone; and representative of International-Lawyers.org, an NGO accredited to the United Nations and the 
African Union. 
1 Quoted in Milman, O., “Pacific islands make las-ditch please to world before Paris climate talks, the guardian 
newspaper (1 November 2015) accessed at http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/02/pacific-islands-
make-last-ditch-plea-to-world-before-paris-climate-change-talks (on 1 November 2015). 
2 1771 UNTS 107 (1992). 
3 See below n 15en page 16.  
4 The drawn out negotiations of the Doha Round of international trade negotiations, for example, do not have the same 
urgency of timeliness, and global trade has not diminished as a result of the slow pace. 
5 2303 UNTS 162 (1997). 
6 The Draft agreement and draft decision on workstreams 1 and 2 of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action version adopted by Member States at the Plenary held around 18:00 hours and released 
by the Secretariat at 23:00 hours on 23 October 2015. On 6 November 2015 and edited and slightly revised version was 
released and on 15 November 2015 the edited version was re-issued. 
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by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) 7 before being 
adopted by the COP and opened for signature and ratification by States at the same meeting in 
Paris, France in December 2015.  
 
This contribution describes and analyses some of the most important parts of the Draft Agreement 
(part II) and three cross-cutting issues (part III). It then ends with some concluding remarks about 
where we may be after COP21 (part IV). It is hoped that the descriptions and analysis might 
contribute to better understanding of what is at stake at COP21 from the perspective of international 
climate change law and international human rights law. 
 
THE COP21 OUTCOME (DRAFT AGREEMENT)8 
 
The 23 October 2015 text is the negotiating text that States take with them to Paris when the last 
ADP session will take place and then the COP21 will consider the text for adoption. It is a text 
based on the negotiations between States, from which civil society was largely excluded and in 
which suspicions of all State Parties were heightened. As a result, there was an atmosphere of 
mistrust among State Parties, observers, and even co-chairs even as the negotiating text emerged 
from the spin-off groups late in the evening of 23 October 2015. This text rather than being the text 
of a draft treaty harkens back to the Geneva Draft of February 2015. Like the Geneva Draft, the text 
is a compilation of the different proposals of States. The text of the Draft Agreement contains 26 
articles and a preamble spread over 29 pages with more than 2500 brackets and almost 30 “no text” 
options. The co-chairs’ 5 October effort to streamline the text had failed and States’ efforts to do so 
were marginal as most of the differences remain. Nevertheless, the G77 recognised the text as “a 
basis and a starting point for negotiations during the next session”9 and the European Union referred 
to it as “Party-owned with a clear structure.”10 It is the 23 October text of 23:30 (Draft Agreement) 
that States will be studying as they prepare for COP21. It is this text that is described and evaluated 
below. 
 
Preamble 
 
The preamble has been expanded from the six preambular paragraphs in the 5 October text back to 
15 paragraphs. Preambular paragraphs 1-3 stress that the Draft Agreement is in “furtherance” of the 
UNFCCC’s objective, but a reference to its principles and provisions remains in brackets. No 
mention is made of the Draft Agreement being intended to implement the UNFCCC nor is there an 
express statement acknowledging that the Draft Agreement is under the UNFCCC.11 The mandate 
of the ADP is recalled by a reference to four COP decisions in the preambular paragraph 3. 
 
Preambular paragraph 4 stresses the special vulnerabilities of some States12 and the potential list of 
especially vulnerable States is more limited and different than the list in article 4(8) of the 
                                                
7 COP Decision 1/CP.17, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 2012). The mandate of the ADP which has 
functioned since 2012 is to “develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under 
the Convention applicable to all Parties.” 
8 The following section reflects a preliminary evaluation of the 23 October text or the Draft Agreement done 
immediately after the adoption of the text at ADP2.11. 
9 Bose, I., “TWN Bonn Climate News Update No. 8: Balanced ‘Party-owned’ text as basis for Paris negotiations,” p. 1 
Third World Network: Malaysia (23 October 2015) accessed at 
http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/news/Bonn17/TWN_update8.pdf (23 October 2015). 
10 Ibid at p.2.  
11 Art 2, Draft Agreement. 
12 These States refer to developing countries, least developed countries, small island developing States, small 
mountainous developing States, Africa States, and States of the Central American isthmus. 
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UNFCCC.13 The States whose economies are highly dependent on fossil fuels appear no longer to 
be considered vulnerable.14   
 
Preambular paragraphs 5, 10 and 11 seem to be a collection of thoughts for a diverse group of 
interests15 and paragraphs 6 and 7 state what would seem to be obvious, which is that urgent and 
sustained action is needed to address the adverse consequences of climate change and that the 
impacts of climate change are already being felt.  
 
In addition, the 15 preambular paragraphs in the 23 October text now contain references to the 
inter-sectoral nature of climate change action,16 note that the “largest share of historical global 
emissions” occur in developed countries but the emissions of  developing countries are growing,17 
recognise that future action should depend on economic and emissions trends,18 and reaffirm the 
importance of education.19 The importance of sinks20 and land use in relation to food security is also 
emphasised.21 Finally, carbon pricing is considered important for the cost-effective cutting of 
emissions.22 This last is somewhat controversial realising as Frank Ackerman of the Stockholm 
Environment Institute and Tufts University does, that “[w]hile carbon prices will change energy 
costs, energy consumption and carbon emissions, relying on this mechanism alone would be both 
ineffective and inequitable.”23  
 
Definitions (art. 1) 
 
The 5 October text limited definitions to the parties to the agreement and “the COP serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Agreement (CMA)”.24 Although the co-chairs’ tool did not suggest 
that a new governing body would need to be created, the earlier 24 July 2015 text did appear to 
make such a suggestion. The 23 October text again introduces the CMA in Article 1, paragraph 3 as 
is likely legally necessary until all the Parties to the UNFCCC have ratified the Draft Agreement. 
While this is necessary it will likely further deplete the already dangerously weak authority of the 
COP under the UNFCCC. 
 
The 23 October text also suggests a vague definition of developing and developed countries; 
however, reaching meaningful agreement on this definition will not be easy. Article 2, paragraph 1, 
clearly anchors the Charter of the United Nations in the sovereign equality of all its Member States. 
This equality does not mean treating countries equally in relation to matters in which they are 
unequal.25 The UNFCCC contains two annexes, the first including both developed countries and 
                                                
13 Art. 4(8), UNFCCC. A list of vulnerable States as stated in art. 4(8) includes those that are small islands; low-lying 
coastal; arid and semi-arid; liable to floods and forest decay; prone to natural disasters, drought and desertification; have 
fragile mountainous ecosystems; are landlocked, or, are highly dependent on fossil fuel. 
14 Compare preambular paragraph (Pp.) 20 and art. 4(8)(h), UNFCCC.  
15 The diverse group of interests range from poverty reduction, health, and sustainable development to ecosystem 
integrity and human rights, including food security and the rights of indigenous peoples, women, children and persons 
with disabilities. 
16 Pp. 5, Draft Agreement (23 October 2015). 
17 Ibid, pp. 8. 
18 Ibid, pp. 9. 
19 Ibid, pp. 14. 
20 Ibid, pp. 13. 
21 Ibid, pp. 13. 
22 Ibid, pp. 15. 
23 See Ackerman, F., “Carbon Markets are Not Enough (Chap. 3),” at 26 in UNCTAD, Trade and Environment Review 
2009/2010: Promoting poles of clean growth to foster the transition to a more sustainable economy (2010). 
24 Art. 1(1-3), Draft Agreement. 
25 By way of example, as in 1992, today there are a relatively small number of countries that are high income countries 
having a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of over US$12,746. Most people in the world live on less than US12, 
746. According to the World Bank in 2008 more than 80% lived on less than US$10 per day or less than US$3650 per 
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countries in transition and the second only the former, which are given more responsibilities for 
cutting back their emissions as well as assisting non-Annex I States. The references to developed 
and developing countries in the UNFCCC are linked to Annex I. “Party included in Annex I” is 
defined in the UNFCCC.26 
 
An effort is also made to define REDD+,27 JMA (as an “alternative to REDD+),28 results-based 
payments, 29  climate forcers, 30  and emissions reductions, 31  which appears to assume carbon 
trading.32 An article devoted to defining the controversial REDD+ mechanism has also been added 
in article 3bis in terms of COP19 decisions33 and states the purpose of the REDD+ mechanism.34  
 
Surprisingly, there is no definition of nationally determined mitigation commitments or 
contributions (NDMCs), which are instead defined in the options for article 3, paragraph 2. Finally, 
every word in Article 1 after the chapeaux and definitions of “Parties present and voting,”35 “Party,” 
36 and “CMA” has been placed in brackets. 
 
General (art. 2 and 2bis) 
 
Article 2 states the purpose of the agreement. Options for the first of two paragraphs range from 
merely repeating the objective of the UNFCCC from its article 237 to defining that article in terms 
of different versions of a 2°C or 1.5°C limit on global temperature rises.38 Despite calls by leading 
climate experts for keeping global warming under 1°C, there is no such option in the text.39 A 
second paragraph appears to be a concession to some of the most important concerns of some States 
and civil society and constitutes some of the more ambitious text in the Draft Agreement.40 The 
inclusion of “the right to health and sustainable development” is new and appears to significantly 
                                                                                                                                                            
year. See World Bank, World Bank Development Indicators (2008) and Chen, S., and Ravallion, M., The developing 
world is poorer than we thought, but no less successful in the fight against poverty, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 4703 (August 2008). This amount of money is woefully insufficient to access even the most basic 
nutrition, health, and housing services. Using the United Nations’ figures therefore would not provide a credible 
indicator of States’ level of development. Perhaps for that reason the UNFCCC, although speaking of developed and 
developing countries, does not define them. 
26 Art. 1(13), Draft Agreement. 
27 Ibid at para. 7. REDD+ is defined “as a mechanism aimed at reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in 
developing countries that is based on the Warsaw Framework for REDD+”. 
28 JMA is defined as the “joint mitigation and adaptation actions”. 
29 Ibid, para. 7bis. 
30 Ibid, para. 5.  Climate forcers are defined as “compounds or group of compounds that contribute to climate change”. 
31 Emissions reductions are defined as “the sum of all reduced emissions and increased carbon stocks”. 
32 Ibid, para. 6. 
33 Art. 3bis(2), Draft Agreement. 
34 Ibid, para. 3. 
35 Art. 1(1), Draft Agreement. 
36 Ibid, para. 2. 
37 Art. 2(1), Draft Agreement. 
38 Ibid, para. 1(a). 
39 Hansen, J., Sato, M., Hearty, P., Ruedy, R., Kelley, M., Masson-Delmotte, V., Russell, G., Tselioudis, G., Cao, J., 
Rignot, E., Velicogna, I., Kandiano, E., Schuckmann, K. von, Kharecha P., Legrande, A.N., Bauer, M., and Lo, K.W., 
“Ice melt, sea level rise and superstorms: evidence from paleoclimate data, climate modeling, and modern observations 
that 2°C  global warming is highly dangerous,” 15 Atmos. Chem. Phys. Discuss. 20059–20179 (2015). 
40  This includes references to “equity,” “science,” “the principles of equity and common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities,” “the integrity and resilience of natural ecosystems,” “the integrity of 
Mother Earth,” the “protection of health,” “a just transition of the Workforce,” “decent work and quality jobs,” “respect, 
protection, promotion and fulfillment of human rights for all, including the right to health and sustainable 
development,” “the right of people under occupation,” “gender equality and the full and equal participation of women,” 
and “intergenerational equity.” 
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strengthen the rights language in the Draft Agreement. References to Mother Earth, indigenous 
rights and the rights of people living under occupation have been proposed before but usually 
disappear from the text. Some of the above mentioned text in article 2, paragraph 2, as well as 
article 2 as a whole, is in brackets. This could mean that this ambitious text could be among the first 
victims of political compromise. This is signaled by the “no text” option.  
 
Article 2bis focuses on States reporting requirements of their voluntary contributions suggesting 
that they become legally binding, using the word “implement” in its paragraph 1.41 Paragraph 2 
states that nationally determined contributions “will represent a progression in light of Parties' 
differentiated responsibilities and commitments”42 in an effort to reach the ambition that is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the UNFCCC. The paragraph complements and details the 
common but differentiated nature of States’ commitments.43 It nevertheless represents a very weak 
attempt to make voluntary contributions legally binding, which may inadvertently result in locking 
in commitments that are inadequate to protect billions of vulnerable people. The “no text” Option 2 
indicates that even this weak attempt is controversial for some States.  
 
Mitigation (art. 3) 
 
By far the longest article in the 23 October text, article 3 runs for more than 8 pages with 19 sub-
paragraphs.44 Despite the lengthy text, the Draft Agreement currently contains no clear mitigation 
obligations for any State and certainly no adequate collective objective. The collective long-term 
goal is defined at anything between 40% and 70% reductions based on 2010 emissions levels by 
2050.45 Thus considering that the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report stressed the need for the 
peaking of global emissions by 2015, even the most optimistic of the above collective goals is 
wholly inadequate. The individual efforts seem to be based on a version of the voluntary-pledges-
option proposed in Copenhagen at COP15 despite the controversy it caused at that time.46 In the 
Draft Agreement some options require States to implement their NDMCs. If the Draft Agreement 
voluntary commitments are anywhere near the commitments made by States in the INDCs, they 
will fall far short of what is required for adequate action to address the adverse effects of climate 
change. Paragraphs 3 to 5 make an effort to increase the mitigation ambition of States, but without 
an accountability mechanism these paragraphs on differentiated efforts, 47  progression, 48  and 
ambition49 are likely to lack enforceability. Despite these de minimis provisions, some Western 
commentators have even called for further weakening the Draft Agreement by ensuring it is not 
legally binding.50 Such suggestions are inconsistent with the agreed mandate of the ADP to 
                                                
41 Art. 2bis(1), Option 1, Draft Agreement. 
42 Ibid, para. 2. 
43 Ibid, para. 2. The paragraph states that “[t]he extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement 
this Agreement will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments on 
provision of finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building.” 
44 These paragraphs are on (1) the collective long-term goal, (2) individual efforts, (3) differentiated efforts, (4) 
progression, (5) ambition, (6) information, (7) features, (8) timing, (9) housing, (10) accounting, (11) methods and 
guidance, (12) long-term strategies; (13) response measures; (14) unilateral measures, (15) REIOS, (16) cooperative 
approaches, (17) support, (18) framing, and (19) international transport emissions.   
45 Art. 3(1), Option 1, Draft Agreement. 
46 See, for example, Doebbler, C.F.J. and Wewerinke, M.J., “What happened in Copenhagen,” Al-Ahram Weekly, Issue 
No. 978 (24 – 30 December 2009). 
47 Art. 3, para. 3, Draft Agreement. 
48 Ibid para. 4. 
49 Ibid para. 5. 
50 See Ottinger, R., “For CoP-21 “Legally Binding” Means Bound To Fail,” 45(5) Environmental Policy and 
Law179 (2015). 
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“develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the 
Convention applicable to all Parties.”51 
 
In the proposed paragraph on the information States should communicate in regards to their 
NDMCs, the description of the information as providing “clarity, transparency and understanding” 
appears agreed in a rare step forward in the text.52 There are two options for paragraphs on the 
features of the NDMCs. The first provides for obligations for all States without consideration of 
CBDR,53 the second for a differentiated approach that is consistent with CBDR.54 
 
The remaining paragraphs 8 through 19 deal generally with technical aspects of reporting 
NDMCs.55 Some options for paragraphs 8 and 9 speak of an annex.56 Unlike the annex B of the 
Kyoto Protocol that contains emissions reduction commitments as quantified percentages of a base 
year, a footnote indicates that commitments would be based on national determined voluntary 
contributions or NDMCs.57 In the provision on methods and guidance, one option allows loose 
counting including land use and REDD+,58 while another Option expressly rejects provisions on 
accounting and land use.59 The Options for long-term strategies include a requirement that States 
“shall formulate low emissions development strategies with time frames for zero emissions.”60 
Developing countries also submitted proposals for ensuring adequate response measures61 and 
prohibiting unilateral measures,62 but these proposals were met with “no text” proposals from the 
developed countries. A provision allowing regional economic integration organisations to report 
collectively for their Member States appears in paragraph 15 in brackets as is true for most of the 
proposals already mentioned. However, such a provision is mirrored in the UNFCCC and the KP 
texts. Provisions for cooperative approaches range from “no text”63 to provisions that appear aimed 
at ensuring that cooperative action is only counted once.64 Both Options for provisions on support 
appear aimed at ensuring developing countries “new and additional financial resources, technology 
transfer and capacity building”65 as is already required by article 4 of the UNFCCC. Paragraph 18 
of the article 3 repeats the references to CBDR. Finally, the provisions on international transport 
emissions essentially repeat article 2, paragraph 2 of the Kyoto Protocol.66 As a consequence 
aviation and maritime emissions that are growing at the rate of 300% by 2050 are left to the 
discretion of industry monitors who have not been willing to set clear emissions limitation targets. 
Moreover, the complete silence about military emissions leaves a huge amount of emissions 
unfairly reported and increases the potential that they could be under-reported.67 
 
                                                
51 COP Decision 1/CP.17, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (15 March 2012). 
52 Ibid para. 6. 
53 Ibid para. 7, Option 1. 
54 Ibid para. 7, Option 2. 
55 Reporting should be timely, transparent, and without double counting. 
56 Ibid paras. 8 and 9. 
57 Ibid para. 8(a), Option 1, nn. 7. 
58 Ibid para. 11, Option 1. 
59 Ibid para. 11, Option 2. 
60 Ibid para. 12. 
61 Ibid para. 13. 
62 Ibid para. 14. 
63 Ibid para. 16, Option 4. 
64 Ibid para. 16, Option 2. 
65 Ibid para. 17. 
66 See above n 5. 
67  See International Panel on Climate Change, Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas 
Inventories, IPCC: Bracknell, UK (2007), stating that military emissions can be reported in aggregate or in the country 
where they are actually being made, thus allowing the real source of military emissions to be obscured and controls on 
this reporting to be more difficult. It can also lead to the consequences that overseas military bases, even in occupied 
territories are counted as emissions of the occupied country. 
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Articles 3bis and 3ter seem to transcend the mitigation and adaptation divide. The former deals with 
REDD-plus (REDD+) and thus states its purpose.68 It also appears from the lack of brackets around 
paragraph 3 in article 3bis that the definition accorded to REDD+ is agreed, although difference 
remains on whether to describe REDD-plus as a “[m]echanism for mitigation and adaptation”69 and 
whether to create a “Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Mechanism.” 70 In contrast to article 3bis that 
is based on an issue that the COP began discussing in 2005,71 the discussion of article 3ter seems to 
have been inspired by the recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals.72 As such it is not 
without controversy and includes widely divergent options among the five options,73 including a 
“no text”74 option. The article appears to be an effort to ensure climate action achieves sustainable 
development, but it is vague and incomplete.75 
 
The agreement contains alternatives that include both binding mitigation obligations and voluntary 
mitigation pledges. The division between mainly developing States that support the former and 
developed States that are stubbornly fighting to maintain the latter, which they introduced at 
COP15, appears to be widening.76 Unless this gap can be bridged any mitigation action prompted 
by the Draft Agreement is likely to be inadequate. The hope that the INDCs that all countries 
agreed to provide might help to increase ambition seems to have dissipated as their due date was 
moved back to a now almost meaningless 31 October 2015. Nevertheless, the INDCs provided by 
many States by this date have been shown to be very inadequate to achieve even a 2°C warming 
limit.77 At this late date it was too late for the INDCs to have a significant impact on the Draft 
Agreement as the UNFCCC Secretariat and States' delegations have not had adequate time to 
evaluate the INDCs. Nevertheless, the UNFCCC’s report issued on 30 October 2015 indicates that 
the INDCs of States producing more than 90% of the world emissions are not ambitious enough to 
prevent global warming well in excess of the already dangerous 2°C limit,78 not to mention the 
safer 1.5°C or 1°C goals. Nevertheless, it optimistically concludes that as a first step, the INDCs are 
valuable. The danger that this level of warming means is emphasised by seventeen of the world's 
leading climate scientists in their recently published study that concludes that “2°C global warming 
above the preindustrial level, which would spur more ice shelf melt, is highly dangerous.”79 Their 
conclusions showed that much of the harm that had been predicted by the IPCC had become 
unavoidable and was already taking place at a much faster rate than had been earlier predicted.  
 
                                                
68 The purpose of REDD+ is to “incentivize the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and to 
promote conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries, while enhancing the non-carbon benefits derived as a result of the multiple functions of forests, including 
alleviating poverty and building ecosystem resilience.”  
69 Ibid para. 1.  
70 Ibid para. 4.  
71 See UNFCCC COP Decisions 2/CP.13 (The Bali Action Plan) and 2/CP.13 (2007). 
72 “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” UNGA Res. A/RES/70/1 (21 October 
2015) adopted at the 4th plenary meeting of the UNGA (25 September 2015). 
73 For example, Art. 3ter, Option 4 of the Draft Agreement seems to favour a differentiated approach in which 
assistance to developing countries is a focus, while Option 1seems to encourage ambition in a manner by which they 
contributions of States are not differentiated. 
74 Art. 3ter, Option 5, Draft Agreement. 
75 For example, Option 1  
76 This needs more explanation. G-77 wants binding for OECD and voluntary for themselves. EU wants binding for all, 
but could give some voluntariness to some G-77. US+ wants voluntary for all if China does not take binding. 
77 NGO Coalition, “Fair Shares: A Civil Society Equity Review of INDCs (Summary)” (October 2015) accessed at 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/ib-civil-society-review-climate-indcs-191015-
en_2.pdf (1 November 2015). 
78 UNFCCC, “Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of the intended nationally determined contributions,” UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/7 (30 October 2015). 
79 See above n 39. 
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A bright spot might have been that there is attention to zero emissions in the mitigation section of 
the Draft Agreement, but the vaguely worded alternatives and the lack of any specific commitments 
in the near term even create suspicion about the intention behind this reference. Indeed the use of 
the word “net” seems to indicate that these limits will be reached by wealthy industrialised 
countries either buying the right to pollute from poorer countries that would otherwise not produce 
emissions or resorting to untested or potentially dangerous technologies.80 These practices are 
unsustainable, often dangerous, and will likely not achieve the stabilisation of greenhouse gases 
under dangerous levels.81  
 
The majority of countries, represented by the 134-States G77 and China, have been pushing for 
legally binding quantified emission reduction commitments for developed or Annex I countries, but 
the majority of Annex I countries have resisted by insisting non-Annex I countries take on 
unconditional commitments as well. Moreover, the developed countries appear only willing to 
agree to act in the future if developing countries commit to action first. This tactic has been 
employed by the largest fossil fuel consuming countries throughout the talks and it is hard, at this 
time, to imagine that in the future it will change. The result is that the goal of zero emissions seems 
to be an illusion that is being used as leverage on other issues on which developed countries wish to 
gain concessions. The lack of any mention of fossil fuels in the mitigation section adds to this 
suspicion.     
 
Thus although achieving adequate mitigation ambition in the Draft Agreement is essential, it is 
highly unlikely that it will be achieved given the slow progress to date and the distance between 
States positions. At the center of the slow progress is the dispute over the principle of CBDR, which 
States are obliged to respect according to article 3 of the UNFCCC and which some developed 
States still challenge as to its existence or its interpretation. While the challenges are subsiding with 
a narrowing number of holdout States able to defend their positions in light of the clear words of 
article 3, the number of States seeking to interpret the principle in their unique manner has remained 
stable. Developed States generally claim that the principle means that all States that can take action 
on climate change to an equal degree. The consequence of this interpretation is that if developing 
States will not accept binding legal obligations then all States should have merely ‘voluntary 
commitments’, which are not legal obligations at all. Developing States counter, that the UNFCCC 
framework was intended to create a system for addressing climate change in which developed 
States took the lead and were the only States that had legal obligations on mitigation. The reason for 
this, say developing States, is that the developed States have benefited for centuries from over 
exploitation of the planet’s atmosphere and they, developing States, need the chance to catch up. 
Behind these often articulated positions seems to be a sense of entitlement by many developed 
countries. Despite all the moral pronouncements by such figures as the Catholic Church’s Pope 
Francis82 and the Geneva Interfaith Forum on Climate Change, Environment and Human Rights,83 
the moral message has not yet resonated with developed countries. 
 
Adaptation and loss and damage (arts. 4 and 5)  
 
                                                
80 The achievement of mitigation obligations by carbon trading or turning to dangerous technologies is expressly 
supported by some developed States and by some oil rich States.  
81 Preventing a dangerous level of greenhouses to accumulate in the atmosphere is the objective of the UNFCCC to 
which all States Parties have committed as an international legal obligation.  
82 See, for example, “Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’ of The Holy Father Francis on Care for Our Common Home” (24  
May 2015) accessed at http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html (accessed 5 June 2015). 
83 This group has organised side-events that stress the moral imperative of responsibility by countries who have 
benefited from the historical exploitation of the atmosphere at several interim UNFCCC meetings as well as at the 
COPs since COP15 in 2009. 
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Adaptation, one of the most important aspects of climate action and the Draft Agreement for 
developing countries, covers about two-and-a-half pages of the Draft Agreement but appears far 
from agreed. There are 12 paragraphs, seven of them with more than one option and four with “no 
text” options. Even paragraphs 4 through 8 that have only one option and much text that is not in 
brackets, still contain the significantly different language options of “shall” and “should” as 
alternatives on which there is no agreement. Much of the key differences come down to how the 
principle of CBDR, to which State Parties committed in article 384 will be expressed, or sometimes 
whether it will even be mentioned. This matter has not been resolved and there is little to warrant 
optimism that it will be by COP21. For developing countries it is not only a matter of upholding the 
principle, but also a matter of their very ability to develop economically. Few developing States 
have become developed States over the past 70 years and many fear they will never be able to catch 
up with the developed countries in terms of development under the current climate system that 
would lock them into an apparent choice between their development and contributing to climate 
action.85 This was realised already in 1992, when developed and developing States agreed that 
developed States must take the lead and offer assistance to developing States. However, today, 
many developed States are seeking to renege on this agreement. These developed States appear to 
fear a real realignment of the international order towards a more democratic and equitable one in 
which power and wealth is more evenly shared. The international climate negotiations are perhaps 
the forum in which this tension plays itself out most clearly in international political decision 
making. 
 
As one might expect this tension is reflected in articles 4 and 5 of the Draft Agreement. Paragraph 1 
contains two vague options providing for goals. Although both paragraphs appear to concern long-
term goals this is not entirely clear. Only Option 1 contains a reference to concrete goals linked to 
temperature rise limits, using both 2°C and 1.5°C. Option 2 is a weak call that merely states that 
adaptation is a shared goal and may in fact run counter to the principle of CBDR. Paragraph 2 
contains a catch all Option 1 and an Option 2 based on CBDR. There is also a “no text” option 3. 
Paragraph 3 contains two options, which both acknowledge that “adaptation action should follow a 
country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent approach” and the important 
role of indigenous knowledge.86 There still seems to be a disagreement, however, how CBDR will 
be incorporated. Human rights, the right to life, and the rights of people living under occupation are 
in brackets in the Option 1, but do not appear in Option 2. More importantly, neither health nor the 
right to health is mentioned in either option or in the article on adaptation despite the fact that the 
majority of States presenting INDCs say it is important to adaptation and many, that it is a 
priority.87 Paragraph 4 contains agreement on the importance of adaptation, at least for the most 
vulnerable, although a reference to international cooperation remains in brackets. The theme of 
cooperation is taken up again in paragraph 5, but whether it is an obligation as in the UNFCCC88 or 
has been weakened to a mere aspiration is unclear. Paragraph 6 describes what action States should 
take for adaptation planning and includes assessment, strengthening and monitoring, but exactly of 
what remains unclear. Paragraphs 7 and 8 further specify that States should submit some sort of 
communications about adaptation89 as 50 Least Developed Countries already do to qualify for 
funding; and, there is an option for periodic submissions.90 Paragraph 9 calls for a register for 
                                                
84 Art.3, UNFCCC. 
85 Although using sustainable energy could help developing States to develop without emitting significant levels of 
greenhouse gases, the technology for a ‘green economy’ is being withheld from developing States through the 
intellectual property protections and   
86 Art. 4(3), Option 1, Draft Agreement. 
87 This is based on the author’s review of 100 of the 118 INDCs submitted. 
88 See, for example, art. 4(1)(e), UNFCCC.  
89 Art. 4, para. 7, Draft Agreement. 
90 Ibid Art. 4(8(b)). 
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adaptation communications in one option91 and for “no text” on this matter in another option.92 
Paragraph 10 indicates that States disagree over whether there should be a special high-level 
stocktaking on adaptation at regular intervals93 or that this responsibility should be part of the tasks 
of the CMA of the Draft Agreement’s bodies.94 A third option refers to “no text” at all on this 
matter.95 Paragraph 11 has two options for the involvement of the UNFCCC bodies dealing with 
adaptation, but it appears that there is disagreement about whether the Adaptation Committee and 
the Least Developed Countries Expert Group should be involved in adaptation decisions under the 
Draft Agreement.96 Similarly, States have apparently not agreed on the conditions for eligibility for 
assistance in paragraph 12,97 with one option calling “no text” on separate text on adaptation 
support and for provisions on adaptation to be distributed among article 6 through 9.98 
 
Adaptation includes securing adequate finance, capacity-building, and access to technology that 
will enable vulnerable States to become more resilient to the adverse impacts of climate change. 
Each of these constituents is dealt with elsewhere in the Draft Agreement. This section was 
intended to provide the overall framework for adaptation. It has been bogged down by the 
continuing controversy over the principle of CBDR, which as noted in the section on mitigation, 
States are obliged to respect according to the UNFCCC.99 It is unlikely that much progress will be 
made until an agreement on CBDR is reached. 
 
Article 5 concerns loss and damage, which was previously combined with adaptation in the 5 
October text and put with the undecided elements of the 24 July Tool. Loss and damage is an 
important issue for developing States given that much of the damage they will suffer is now 
unavoidable due to the failure of the international community to act in a timely manner. Article 5 
contains two options. Option 1 is built on the foundation of the Warsaw International Mechanism 
on Loss and Damage,100 defining the mechanism under the Draft Agreement.101 However, exactly 
how the mechanism will be defined is not clear. The purpose of the mechanism, however, is stated 
as “to promote and support the development and implementation of approaches to address loss and 
damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, inter alia, extreme events and slow 
onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change.”102 It should be noted that the whole of Option 1 is in brackets and that Option 2 is 
a “no text” option that states “No reference to loss and damage (no Article 5).” As a result the 
inclusion of loss and damage in the Draft Agreement is still very much up in the air. 
 
The term loss and damage “refers to negative effects of climate variability and climate change that 
people have not been able to cope with or adapt to.”103 While developing States want developed 
States to assist them in dealing with the damage they cannot avoid from climate change, developed 
States retort that they will only assist if their liability is limited. This latter view seems to ignore the 
fact that under general international law, developed States that have contributed to causing climate 
                                                
91 Ibid Art. 4(9), Option 1. 
92 Ibid Art. 4(9), Option 2. 
93 Ibid Art. 4(10), Option 1. 
94 Ibid Option 2. 
95 Ibid Option 3. 
96 Ibid Art. 4(11), Option 1. 
97 Ibid Art. 4(12), Options 1 and 2. 
98 Ibid Art. 4(12), Option 3. 
99 See Article 3, UNFCCC. 
100 See Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, COP Decision 
2/CP.19, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, pp. 6-8 (31 January 2014).  
101 Ibid Art. 5(1), Option 1. 
102 Ibid Art. 5(2). 
103 Warner, K., and Geest, K., van der, “Loss and damage from climate change: local-level evidence from nine 
vulnerable countries,” 5 (4) International Journal of Global Warming 367, 369 (2013). 
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change, despite their legal obligations to cut their emissions, are likely to be liable under 
international law, with very few legal limits, for the damage they cause to developing States.104 A 
provision limiting the liability of developed States will therefore be contrary to the existing legal 
rights of developing States. One would think that developing States would not easily cede their 
legal rights as it appears developed State are demanding. 
 
Finance (art. 6) 
 
Finance is the first of a trinity of obligations that developed States have towards developing States. 
The other two are the obligation to transfer technology105 and to help developing countries build 
their capacity to adapt to climate change, to contribute to mitigation, and to meet their reporting 
obligations under the UNFCCC and the Draft Agreement.106 Perhaps the weakest provisions in the 
Draft Agreement are those concerning finance. This is perhaps the most troubling aspect of 
international climate action. Although there are two options of 4 and 21 paragraphs, respectively, 
neither contains any concrete financial commitments. The first Option uses phrases like “mobilize, 
and/or facilitate” that are unlikely to contribute to building the trust needed to achieve an ambitious 
Draft Agreement. Furthermore, although scaling up financing is mentioned,107 no mechanism to 
ensure this is put in place, in fact no mechanism to ensure States meet their already existing  
financing obligation, appears in the Draft Agreement. This was a major issue for developing States 
during the negotiating session that took place between February and October 2015, but it was not 
resolved.     
 
The approximately three pages of provisions on finance in the co-Chairs tool fail to provide for any 
meaningful obligations for developing States to provide climate finance. The need to focus on 
public finance is not even articulated clearly. Even though private sources of finance will be 
woefully inadequate to meet the cost of dealing with climate change,108 even the 100 billion per 
year goal is proving overly optimistic given the ambiguity about how the finance will materialise. 
The principles that are supposed to guide finance and which are already embedded in the UNFCCC, 
such as the obligation for developed countries to provide new and additional finance to assist 
developing countries, is not clearly articulated in Option 1109 and only within brackets in Option 
2.110 Missing from the text is also any mention of curbing fossil fuel subsidies. 
 
The UNFCCC unambiguously states that “[t]he developed country Parties and other developed 
Parties included in Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed 
full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations” to report and 
                                                
104 The law of State responsibility for harm caused to another State by an act that is inconsistent with an existing legal 
obligation towards that State, such as a legal obligation flowing from a multilateral treaty like the UNFCCC, creates the 
duty to, among other obligations, pay adequate compensation to the injured State. See The Factory at Chorzow (Claim 
for Indemnity) (The Merits) (Germany v. Poland), PCIJ Reports, (Ser. A), No. 17 (13 September 1928) at para. 125, p. 
48 and Trail Smelter, UNRIAA, vol. III (Sales No. 1949.V.2), p. 1905 (1938, 1941). The reason developed States will 
carry this burden of State responsibility is that only they, and not developing States, have obligations to mitigate their 
greenhouse gas emissions that they have not met. 
105 Art. 7 in the Draft Agreement. See also 4(4)(concerning least developed countries), art. 4(8) read in conjunction with 
arts. 4(7) and 11(1), UNFCCC. 
106 Arts. 8 and 9 of the Draft Agreement. See also arts. 4(1)(c)-(e) and (g)-(i), 5(b) and (c), UNFCCC .   
107 Art. 6(8bis) (in brackets). 
108 See Kowalzig, J., “Climate, Poverty, and Justice: What the Poznan UN climate conference needs to deliver for a fair 
and effective global deal,” 124 Oxfam Briefing Paper p. 15 (December 2008). Although few academics or institutions 
have even attempted to estimate private financial flows, it is logical to understand that private finance will not be 
adequate because private fiancé is done on a profit making basis and today financial flows from North to South—as 
climate finance should be—result in profits being repatriated to the North   
109 Art. 6, Option 1. 
110 Ibid, Option 2. 
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take action on climate change.111  The UNFCCC further obliges States to take into account 
“adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing 
among the developed country Parties” in the funds they provide.112 This vision does not seem to be 
communicated by the current draft text concerning finance. The same vague language that plagues 
other parts of the Draft Argument is also present in the financing options. Options range from 
binding commitments, to which developed States steadfastly object, to aspirations that again 
threaten to render the agreement irrelevant for achieving international action. 
 
In the negotiations developed States have been insisting on provisions that provide for a larger role 
for the private sector, while refusing to commit to providing adequate finance, capacity building, 
and technology to developing countries. Developing countries in turn demanded that developed 
States provide them the new and additional finance, capacity building, and technology with even 
more assurances of adequacy. An example is the developed countries refusal to engage fully in 
discussions about exceptions to the intellectual property rights, which often prevent developing 
States from acquiring the technology necessary to green their economies. While almost all but a 
handful of States have embraced market mechanisms, few are willing to rely on them without the 
State committing to be the ultimate provider of last resort. The controversy over market and non-
market mechanisms may, however, merely be masking the larger problem that some of the 
wealthiest and historically most polluting States are unwilling to give up the advantages they have 
gained by their overexploitation of the planet's atmosphere and many of its people. 
 
The real test of the commitment to financing will be what money is actually put forward, for 
example by deposit or at least signed agreement, in the Green Climate Fund. Recent moves by 
developed countries to double count, provide vague oral promises without any money on the table, 
and to generally restrict their financing obligations, could render the Draft Agreement incapable of 
implementation, especially at the level that existing law and science indicates is necessary. 
 
The lack of any type of accountability mechanism to ensure that commitments will be fulfilled I 
likely to ensure the inadequacy of any financing. Equally concerning is that other forums where it 
was hoped progress would be made towards providing adequate climate finance, turned out to be 
failures. Perhaps most notable of these failures was the Third Financing for Development 
Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in July 2015 which adopted an outcome document, 
which did not contain any real commitments, back-tracked on some, and appeared to perpetuate a 
failing business as usual, scenario.113 This meeting, it had been hoped at one point, would provide 
the resources for the achievement of both climate change goals and the Sustainable Development 
Goals.114 In fact no money was put on the table and there was instead backtracking by States from 
the pledges that they had made decades ago. As a consequence the mobilisation of 100 billion USD 
per year by 2020 to address climate change looks quite unrealistic, despite the fact that the amount 
of financing estimated to be needed globally is almost 6 trillion USD per year by 2020.115  
 
Technology development and transfer (art. 7)  
 
Together with finance and capacity-building, technology development and transfer is one of the 
main consequences of CBDR and thus one of the primary responsibilities of developed States 
                                                
111 Art. 4(3), UNFCCC. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda), annexed to UN Doc. A/69/313 (27 July 2015). 
114 See above n 72. 
115 World Economic Forum, The Green Investment Report: The ways and means to unlock private finance for green 
growth (A Report of the Green Growth Action Alliance) p. 13 (2013). 32 See arts. 4, para. 5, 5, 6, and 9, para. 2(d) of 
the UNFCCC. 
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towards developing States.116 It has also been a standing concern of the COP. As long ago as COP7 
in Marrakesh, Morocco, an Expert Group on Technology Transfer was created to advise the COP 
through its Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA).117 A major obstacle to 
adequate transfer of technology between developed and developing countries, however, has been 
intellectual property rights. These rights are not even mentioned in the Draft Agreement, and only 
meekly mentioned in the draft COP21 decision.118    
 
Elsewhere in the Draft Agreement seven paragraphs are concerned with technology development 
and transfer, but four of them include “no text” options. Paragraph 1 states a general goal of 
development and transfer and some vague language of encouragement.119 Paragraph 1ter makes an 
effort to encourage the same thing by giving authority to the CMA to take action of encouragement 
and by requiring States to submit reports at regular, but otherwise undefined, intervals.120 Paragraph 
2 contains an option calling for the CMA to adopt a technology framework121 and another merely 
referring to the framework. 122  Other paragraphs address developed countries’ duty to help 
developing countries overcome barriers to technology access and development, 123  strengthen 
existing mechanisms,124 and support developing countries.125  
 
Capacity-building (art. 8 and 8bis) 
 
Capacity building is also found in the UNFCCC across several articles that deal with strengthening 
the resilience of countries to withstand climate change shocks.126 Although the UNFCCC only uses 
the phrase “capacity building” once, reference to enhancing endogenous capacity, strengthening the 
scientific capabilities of countries, and cooperation on education and training are all in reality 
references to capacity-building. Several forums have been created to discuss capacity-building. One 
of these, the Durban Forum on Capacity-building, held its fourth meeting during the June 2015 
meeting of the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Body for Implementation. In addition, existing bodies like 
the Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network, the Standing 
Committee on Finance, and the Green Climate Fund, all play an important role in capacity building 
and participate in the Durban forum.  
 
Capacity-building was first addressed explicitly at COP5 held in Bonn, Germany.127 It also 
appeared as part of the COP7 outcome known as the Marrakesh Accords in a decision entitled 
“Capacity building in developing countries (non-Annex I Parties)” focusing on assistance by 
developed countries to developing countries. 128  The COP decisions emphasise that capacity 
                                                
116 Art. 4(1, 3, 5, 7- 9), UNFCCC. 
117 COP Decision 4/CP.7 (2001), UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 at pp. 22. 
118 Paras. 2bis, Options 1, and 50, Option 1(d), option (a), COP21 Decision. In both cases the mention of intellectual 
property is met with “no text” options. 
119 Art. 7, para. 1, Draft Agreement. 
120 Ibid 7, para. 1ter. 
121 Ibid 7, para. 2, Option 1. 
122 Such a framework would complement the “Framework for meaningful and effective actions, to enhance the 
implementation of Article 4, paragraph 5, of the Convention” agreed in an annex to COP Decision 4/CP.7, UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 at p. 24 (21 January 2002).  
123 Art. 7(2bis), Option 1. Option two is a “no text” option. 
124 Ibid para. 3, on which there appears to be agreement in both Options that the Technology Mechanism established in 
2010, see COP Dec.,  that consists of two advisory bodies, namely Technology Executive Committee and a Climate 
Technology Centre and Network, should be strengthened. 
125 Ibid paras. 4 and 5. 
126 See arts. 4(5), 5(a) and (b), 6, and 9(2)(d), UNFCCC.  
127 COP Dec. 10/CP.5, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 (2 February 2000) at p. 24.  
128 COP Dec. 2/CP.7, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (21 January 2002) at p. 5. But see, COP Dec. 3/CP.7 Ibid, at 
15, on capacity building in countries with economies in transition. 
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building should be country-driven and aimed at assisting developing countries. The BRICS 
ministers of environment from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa reiterated this in their 
recent meeting.129 
 
The Draft Agreement is not so explicit in the four options for paragraph 1 of Article 8.130 In each 
case “countries developing” is modified, but usually in way that merely gives particular attention to 
specific types of developing countries such as the most vulnerable. This could be understood as 
merely stressing the importance of the most vulnerable developing countries, or, if there are 
inadequate resources to really achieve adequate capacity-building as meaning that only the special 
groups are assisted, which would be contrary to the intention expressed in the UNFCCC. The idea 
of country ownership is expressed in both the two options for paragraph 2.131 Paragraph 3 contains 
an Option 1 calling for scaling up, but an option 2 merely calls for “All Parties” to cooperate, 
apparently ignoring the differentiated responsibilities of States required by the principle of CBDR. 
Paragraph 3bis concerns the preparation and communication of “plans, policies, actions and 
measures on capacity-building” by developed countries132 as well as a “no text” option.133 Finally, 
paragraph 4 concerns institutional arrangements including an option calling for enhancing the 
institutions and existing provisions on capacity-building 134 and the other for ensuring the 
institutional arrangements to “enhance the effectiveness of capacity building efforts.”135 The latter it 
would appear points towards monitoring and evaluation of developing countries activities for 
capacity-building. The result is a weak article 8 that seems to offer little new in relation to capacity 
building. 
 
Capacity-building is also the theme of article 8bis on education. The first option for this single 
paragraph article strongly calls for cooperation “to develop, adopt and implement policies, 
strategies, regulations and/or action plans on climate change education, training, public awareness, 
public participation and public access to information.”136 The second option is limited to the very 
different “should” and “shall” alternatives for cooperation and enhancing the actions just 
mentioned.137 This paragraph does little to add to that to which States have already agreed.138  
 
Transparency (art. 9) 
 
Considering that States have legal obligations to fulfil their treaty obligations in good faith139 one 
might wonder why an article on transparency is necessary. The answer appears to lie in the lack of 
trust between States. As a result a ten paragraph article 9 on Transparency has been included in the 
Draft Agreement. Article 9 is based on the “Guidelines for the preparation of national 
communications by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention, Part I: UNFCCC reporting 
guidelines on annual greenhouse gas inventories” adopted at COP17.140 These Guidelines explain 
                                                
129 Third World Network, “Developed countries should fulfill their obligations under the Convention, says BASIC,” 
Third World Network: Malaysia (2 November 2015) accessed at 
http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2015/cc151101.htm (2 November 2015). This has never been an un-
biased source for reporting! 
130 See art. 8(1), options 1-4. 
131 Art. 8(2), Options 1 and 2, Draft Agreement. 
132 Ibid para. 3bis, Option 1. 
133 Ibid Option 3. 
134 Ibid para. 4, Option 1. 
135 Ibid para. 4, Option 2. 
136 Art. 8bis, Option 1. 
137 Ibid Option 2. 
138 Art. 4(1)(i) and article 6, UNFCCC. 
139 See, for example, Art. 26, Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1155 UNTS 331 (1980) and Nuclear Tests 
(Australia v. France),  ICJ Reports p. 268, para. 46 (1974). 
140 COP Dec. 15/CP.17, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2 (15 March 2012) at 24. 
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that “[t]ransparency means that the data sources, assumptions and methodologies used for an 
inventory should be clearly explained, in order to facilitate the replication and assessment of the 
inventory by users of the reported information.”141 Article 9 goes on to encourage States to report 
accurately and in a comparable manner that is linked to the obligations to which the particular 
States have agreed. To achieve this, however, the current provisions would have to be significantly 
strengthened. This would especially require an accountability mechanism such as has been 
suggested by Bolivia in its proposal for an International Climate Justice Tribunal.142 
 
Timeframes and implementation (arts. 10 and 11) 
 
One of the weakest parts of the Draft Agreement is its provisions on facilitating implementation and 
compliance. The paragraphs on timeframes are confusing and largely bracketed. On the one hand, 
there seems to be a push for new INDCs, but as national determined contributions or NDCs. On the 
other hand, most of the provisions remain in brackets. The lack of legally binding commitments 
make the timeframes appear illusionary. In fact, a closer reading shows that the only commitments 
which appear to have timeframes are commitments of intention, but not action. The provisions 
allowing countries to adjust their contributions only ‘upwards’ is a small, if barely perceivable, step 
towards increasing ambition, but it is also one based on voluntary good faith, something that has not 
been in abundance during the negotiations to date. 
 
An attempt has been made to address the lack of an accountability mechanism in article 9 and 10 by 
creating, respectively, another body similar to the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance Committee143 and a 
periodic stocktaking procedure.144 
 
To date the failure to create a strong accountability mechanism applicable to all States with the 
authority to make legally binding decisions, has significantly hampered the implementation of 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. While both these treaties include provisions for the settlement of 
disputes, they rely on the acceptance by State Parties either of the International Court of Justice or 
of an arbitration procedure that has never been defined.145 And although States have created a 
Compliance Committee made up of a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch for the Kyoto 
Protocol,146 this mechanism has proved relatively toothless.147 For example, when the Compliance 
Committee determined Canada was in breach of its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol,148 Canada 
                                                
141 Ibid at p. 27, para.4(a). 
142 See art. 11, Option II, Draft Agreement. 
143 Art. 11, Draft Agreement. The Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism was established by COP decision 27/CMP.1,  
144 Art. 9, Draft Agreement. 
145 Art. 14(2)(a) and (b), UNFCCC, provide States the opportunity to accept either the International Court of Justice or 
arbitrary, but does not require them to do so. This article also requires that an annex to the UNFCCC be adopted “as 
soon as practicable” establishing the procedures for arbitration. These procedures have never been established.  
146 COP Decision 24/CP.7, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 at p. 64 and decision of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), CMP decision 27/CMP.1. (The enforcement branch 
for the Kyoto Protocol has the authority to determine that a State Party has exceeded its assigned emissions and to make 
a finding that the State Party is in non-compliance with its legal obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. When this 
happens the State Party is required to make-up the difference between its de facto emissions and its assigned emissions 
limits during the next commitment period with a penalty of 30%). 
147 See Hovi, J., Stokke, O., and Ulfstein, G., Implementing the Climate Regime: International Compliance 136 (2013) 
(pointing out that States can avoid any consequences of the Compliance Committee by merely withdrawing from the 
Kyoto Protocol).  
148 Para. 17, p. 3, Decision of the Enforcement Branch, UNFCCC Doc. CC-2008-1-6/Canada/EB (15 June 2008) (the 
decision also decides that “[t]here is a sufficient factual basis to avert a finding of non-compliance on the date of this 
decision” at para. 17(b), p. 3).   
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merely withdrew from the Protocol before it could be found to have failed to meet its compliance 
obligations.149 
 
A call for a legally binding climate justice tribunal or court has been ardently supported in two 
meetings that combined actors from civil society and State representatives, including heads of 
States, hosted by the Bolivian government.150 To make any implementation agreement effective, a 
legally binding mechanism is likely to be necessary. States, however, have not yet been willing to 
create such an effective mechanism. In some cases domestic legal action seems to have overtaken 
international action to ensure adequate action on climate change.151 One voice clearly calling for an 
international legal mechanism is Bolivia, which has championed the creation of an International 
Tribunal on Climate Justice that would provide legally binding decisions on States’ compliance 
with their obligations in UNFCCC. While the proposal seems to be gaining acceptance among more 
developing States, especially in South America, it has come under attack by European States and 
the United States. Nevertheless, the proposal appears in Option II for article 11 of the Draft 
Agreement152 and again in paragraph 63 of the Draft COP21 Decision. Whether States will have the 
courage and integrity to reiterate their commitment to the principles they agreed in the UNFCCC 
and appear to reaffirm in the Draft Agreement, will be determined at COP21.  
 
Procedures, institutions and decision-making (arts. 12-15 and 22) 
 
The procedures, institutions and decision-making procedures of the Draft agreement are among the 
least controversial. Article 12 deals with the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Draft Agreement or the CMA. A new body is necessary, as there was for the Kyoto 
Protocol until all the State Parties to the UNFCCC also become Parties to the new Agreement. 
States not Party to a treaty cannot be bound by it and have no right to participate in the decision 
making related to that treaty.153 Paragraph 4 shows there is still disagreement over the Rules of 
Procedure and the strength of the implementation activities of the CMA by the several Options 
different States have recorded.  
 
                                                
149 Apparently to avoid a decision on non-compliance, Canada withdrew from Kyoto Protocol effective 15 December 
2012. See Compliance Committee, “Note by the secretariat: Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol and its 
effects on Canada’s reporting obligations under the Protocol, UNFCCC Dec. No. CC/EB/25/2014/2 (20 August 2014) 
at para. 5, p. 1. 
150 From 19 to 22 April 2010 over 15,000 people and up to 70 governments from all over the world attended the World 
People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in Cochabamba, Bolivia that concluded with 
a10-page People’s Agreement on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, accessed at 
http://readingfromtheleft.com/PDF/CochabambaDocuments.pdf, which demands “the creation of an International 
Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal that has the legal capacity to prevent, judge and penalize States, industries 
and people that by commission or omission contaminate and provoke climate change.” Ibid at p. 11. From 10 to 12 
October about 2,500 people and up to 40 governments from all over the world attended the World People’s Conference 
on Climate Change and the Defense of Life in Tiquipaya, Bolivia, which concluded with the adoption of the  
Declaration of the World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change and the Defense of Life in 
http://www.planificacion.gob.bo/sites/folders/2.STATEMENT%20WORLD%20PEOPLE%20TIQUIPAYA.pdf, which 
in several places calls for the establishment of an international climate justice court. Ibid at pp. 6, 18 and 22. See also 
D’Escoto Brockmann, M., Reinventing the U.N: A Proposal (2011) (which contains a draft statute of a Statute of the 
International Tribunal for Climate Justice and Environmental Protection, at pp. 157-172). 
151 See, for example, Urgenda Foundation v. Netherlands, case number: C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396 (24 June 2015) 
(in which a Dutch Court “orders the State to limit the joint volume of Dutch annual greenhouse gas emissions, or have 
them limited, so that this volume will have reduced by at least 25% at the end of 2020 compared to the level of the year 
1990, as claimed by Urgenda, in so far as acting on its own behalf” [translation from original Dutch] at para. 5.1).  
152 At p. 27, Draft Agreement, and, p. 50, Draft COP21 Decision. 
153 Art. 34, VCLT, above n 139, (stating that “[a] treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State 
without its consent.”). 
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Articles 13 and 14 on the Secretariat and the two subsidiary bodies154 both of which already existed 
under the UNFCCC, suggests that these bodies will continue to carry out similar responsibilities 
under the Draft Agreement. The texts of these two articles are agreed without brackets. 
Nevertheless, all the bracketed text in Article 15 indicates that States still do not agree on the role of 
other subsidiary bodies.  
 
Finally, Article 22 first states some obvious rules of voting in paragraphs 1155 and 2156 that are not 
bracketed, and then in bracketed paragraph 3 provides for decision making by a vote of three-
fourths of the States present and voting, by casting an affirmative or negative vote,157 when 
consensus cannot be reached.158 This indicates that the problem of decision making by voting 
remains an ongoing problem.159 
 
Other provisions (arts. 16-21 and 23-26) 
 
The miscellaneous articles include surprises or controversial text and leave fewer issues unresolved 
than the previous articles. Only article 17 contains options which relate to the right to participate in 
decision-making that either make this right conditioned on having submitted NDMCs 160  or 
unconditional.161 The provisions on signature,162 the application of the UNFCCC dispute settlement 
provisions,163 the UN Secretary-General as depository,164 and the six UN language of the Draft 
Agreement,165 have all apparently been agreed. The provision on withdrawal contains not only the 
usual one year waiting period in brackets,166 but also a bracketed proposal that a withdrawal only 
takes effect after a State has satisfied its existing obligations under the Draft Agreement.167 
 
In addition, States have not agreed on the provisions for entry into force. These provisions still have 
bracketed options concerning the necessary number of ratifications, reference year, percentage of 
emissions, and whether “total” or “net” emissions are counted.168 As suggested above, allowing the 
counting of “net” emissions could introduce the possibilities that rich countries could buy the right 
to pollute or resort to untested and risky technologies to remove emissions from the atmosphere, 
thus defeating the purpose of the Draft Agreement. It also appears that agreement may not have 
been reached on allowing reservations,169 although it is hard to see how reservations can be allowed 
to the Draft Agreement when States cannot make reservations to the UNFCCC.170  
 
                                                
154 The two subsidiary bodies established by the UNFCCC are the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (art. 10) and the 
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (art. 9). 
155 Art. 22(1), Draft Agreement (stating that each States has one vote). 
156 Ibid para. 2 (stating that regional economic integration organisations, currently only the European Union, can either 
vote for its members or allow them to vote). 
157 Ibid para. 4. 
158 Ibid para. 3. 
159 The COP under the UNFCCC has never adopted its Rules of Procedure which contains provisions on decision-
making by voting, despite the imperative legal obligation it had to do so at its very first session. See art. 7(3), 
UNFCCC.   
160 Art. 17, Option 1, Draft Agreement. 
161 Ibid Option 2.  
162 Art. 16, Draft Agreement. 
163 Art. 21, Draft Agreement. 
164 Art. 23, Draft Agreement. 
165 Art. 26, Draft Agreement. 
166 Art. 26, para. 1, Draft Agreement. 
167 Art. 26, para. 2, Draft Agreement. 
168 Art. 18, Draft Agreement. 
169 Art. 23, Draft Agreement. 
170 Art. 24, UNFCCC.  
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The fact that States have still not agreed on some of these formal provisions could mean that they 
are being left until the end as there is confidence they can be quickly resolved or that the divisions 
elsewhere are so substantial that States do not see the value in agreeing to formalities, when there 
are such significant disagreements on substance.  
 
THREE CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 
 
Three issues appear to cut across several of the articles in the Draft Agreement. These relate to 
human rights and participation, health, and sustainable development.  
 
Human rights and participation 
 
The impact of climate change on the enjoyment of human rights has been documented not only by 
successive reports of the IPCC but also by the Human Rights Council.171 This realisation is also the 
basis of the Geneva Pledge initiated by the Mary Robinson Foundation. Nevertheless, most States 
have not shown the willingness or interest in addressing climate change from a human rights 
approach. The Geneva Pledge may even have contributed to the skepticism as it appeared to be 
satisfied with a limited approach to human rights that was anchored in participatory civil and 
political rights, instead of addressing the threats that climate change poses to the right to 
development and social and economic rights that are as great a concern to developing States.  
Moreover, the pledge was launched at an informal dinner dubbed a “Climate Justice Dialogue” on 7 
February 2015 to which the majority of NGOs who had been leading the work on human rights and 
climate change within the Geneva-based Human Rights Council were not even invited. Instead of 
encouraging unity among States on human rights on which there was widespread agreement, the 
Geneva Pledge appears to have contributed to the division among States.  
 
Accordingly, it appears that there are now two human rights visions dividing States. The first based 
on the Geneva Pledge and apparently championed by the UN Human Rights Council’s Special 
Rapporteur on human rights and the environment, American Law Professor John Knox, focuses on 
the civil and political right of participation in decision making.172 This approach is anchored in the 
European Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,173 and, as one might expect, focuses on the civil 
and political right to participate in decision making. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur did not 
reply to requests for his support for the rights of observers in the UNFCCC process to be able to 
attend the ADP meetings where negotiations were taking place.174 
 
At the same time, at the Geneva meeting, Iran for the Non-Aligned Movement’s 120 Member States 
—just under two-thirds of the United Nations Member States representing approximately 55% of 
the world population—called for any mention of human rights to include the right to development 
                                                
171 See, for example, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/10/61 (15 January 2009) as well as Human Rights Council Resolutions 7/23 (2008), 10/4 (2009), 18/22 (2011), 
26/27 (2014).  
172 See, for example, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/61 (3 February 2015) and “Human Rights and Climate Change: the Briefing 
Paper drafted for the purpose of informing the Climate Justice Dialogue on 7 February 2015, co-hosted by the OHCHR 
and the Mary Robinson Foundation in Geneva (which emphasises participation in decision making processes).    
173 2161 UNTS 447 (2001). This convention is ratified by 47 States exclusively from Europe and a few central Asia 
States that are trying to establish stronger ties to the European Union. Not a single African, Latin American or Eastern 
Asia State has ratified this treaty.   
174 At least one non-governmental organisation accredited to the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council did not 
receive a response to a request for assistance that was directed to the Special Rapporteur. The Communication is on file 
with the author.  
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as a crucial foundation. This was not acceptable to the several European States, the United States, 
and some other States, that continue to object to the right to development.175 As a result the issue of 
human rights appears to be contributing to the widening of divergent views, instead of 
convergences of views among States. Unless international human rights law is seen as a tool to 
achieve climate justice, its utility is questionable. Even more troubling is the failure of the Draft 
Agreement to ensure climate change action that will prevent the violation of fundamental human 
rights as this will put States in conflict with their international legal obligations and allow others—
both State and non-State actors—to invoke their responsibility.176 
 
Health 
 
Health is a red elephant in the room that States cannot ignore, but towards which they have still 
tried to turn a blind eye. Its relevance to the Rio texts, of which the UNFCCC is one, goes back at 
least to the 1992 Rio meeting. Principle 1 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development177 states that all human beings are “entitled to a healthy and productive life in 
harmony with nature.” The UNFCCC itself states expressly that harm to “human health” is one of 
the consequences of the adverse effects of climate change in its very first article.178 Moreover, 
based on the figures of the World Health Organization (WHO) from 2004,179 it can be estimated 
that in this century at least 154,400,000 (one hundred and fifty-four million and four hundred 
thousand) people will die globally from the adverse effects of climate change in Africa alone, and it 
is likely this figure is increasing because of the global failure to take action to limit emissions.180 
 
Outside the field of health, the right to health is also reaffirmed in numerous universal and regional 
human rights treaties. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights181 to which 160 states have consented as state parties, in article 12 includes the right to 
health. Article 5(e)(iv) of International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination provides for “the right to public health … [and]  … medical care” for persons of all 
racial and ethnic groups without discrimination.182  Articles 11(1)(f), 12 and 14(2)(b) of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women provides for special 
protection of the right to health of women.183 And the most widely ratified human rights treaty in 
the world, the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides a wide range of protection for a 
child's health.184 In addition, the preamble to the WHO Constitution that was adopted in 1946 
recognises that the “enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental 
                                                
175 This is the case despite the adoption of the Declaration of the Right to Development by the overwhelming majority 
of States in UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/41/128 (1986). 
176 Compare Wewerinke, M., and Doebbler, C.F.J., “Exploring the Legal Basis of a Human Rights Approach to Climate 
Change,” 10(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 141-160 (2011) and “Development Cooperation and Human 
Rights: International Climate Change Action: Saving Human Rights After Cancun,” 2 Indian Yearbook of International 
Law and Policy 119-153 (2010-2011). 
177 UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I). 
178 Art. 1(1), UNFCCC. 
179 See World Health Organization, Preventing disease through healthy environments (2006) (Table A2.3: Deaths 
attributable to environmental factors, by disease and mortality stratum for WHO regions in 2004, updated data for 2004, 
listing 1,544,000 deaths per year attributable to environmental risk factors in Africa). 
180 The WHO calculation was based on deaths in Africa that are attributable to the adverse effects of climate change and 
based on conditions existing in 2004. These conditions have deteriorated as emissions continue to rise and did not peak 
by 2015. See also International Panel on Climate Change, “The long-term perspective: scientific and socio-economic 
aspects relevant to adaptation and mitigation, consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Convention, and in 
the context of sustainable development (Topic 5)” at 63, 67, Table 5.1 in Pachauri, R.K., Reisinger, A., and The Core 
Writing Team, (eds.), Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (IPPCC Fourth Assessment Report) (2007). 
181 993 UNTS 3. 
182 660 UNTS 195 (1969). 
183 1249 UNTS 13 (1981). 
184 1577 UNTS 3 (1990), art. 24. This treaty is ratified by 194 States. 
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rights of every human being”185 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an instrument 
reflecting customary international law on this issue, states that “[e]veryone has the right to … health 
and well-being of himself and his family....”186 Hardly any country denies the right to health. The 
United States was perhaps the lone exception that had persistently objected to the right to health, 
but at the May 2013 World Health Assembly of the WHO, the US Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, Kathleen Sebelius, appeared to drop that objection.187 Nevertheless, in the spring of 2015 
the US allegedly stood alone among the Member States of the Organization of American States to 
block the adoption of a Summit of the Americas final declaration with its objection to including a 
reference to the right to health.188 This was likely a violation of international law because the right 
to health is customary international law189 to which the US could no longer be a persistent 
objector.190   
 
Although health was mentioned in some of the many options for the COP21 decision, it has been 
completely ignored in the text distributed on 5 October 2015. It has come back in the Draft 
Agreement distributed on 23 October. Health is mentioned in preambular paragraphs and in article 
2 that describe the purpose of the agreement. It is not, however, mentioned in article 4 on 
Adaptation despite the fact that the majority of countries submitting their INDCs included health as 
a concern of Adaptation, and in many cases a priority. 
 
The main obstacle to including health as an adaptation priority appeared to be the United States. But 
the United States has also provided itself with good scientific reasons to be concerned with the 
consequences of climate change on health. Citing these adverse effects, a United States’ study on 
climate change and health concluded that there are three principles that should guide public health 
action on climate change.191 First, the US study claims, effects of climate change on health should 
be prioritised in research, policy and programmes, and regulatory agendas.192 A significant part of 
the rationale behind this suggestion appears to be the lack of clear evidence of the impact of climate 
change on health to date. In contrast to the United States’ skepticism, many of the impacts of health 
on developing countries, especially those in the Pacific are much clearer, and need more urgently 
than a better understanding of the problem, resources to deal with the adverse effects of climate 
change on health. Secondly, the study suggests avoiding exposure to harm as a policy strategy.193 
For many developing States, especially small island States, avoiding exposure to a phenomenon like 
sea level rise is no longer an option as they hardly contribute to causing these consequences and 
must rely on action by others to avoid them; action which has not been forthcoming. For many 
small island States to adequately protect their people from exposure to harm is an issue of 
                                                
185 Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946). 
186 UNGA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), art. 25. 
187 “U.S. Secretary for Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius addresses the 66thWorld Health Assembly” (20 
May 2013) at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2013/05/20/world-health-assembly/ (accessed 15 August 2015).   
188 Zuesse, E., “U.S. Blocked Declaration of a Right to Health Care, Says Bolivia's President,” Transcend Media 
Service, published on 20 April 2015 at https://www.transcend.org/tms/?p=56692 (accessed on 2 September 2015). 
189 See Xiong, P., An International Law Perspective on the Protection of Human Rights in the TRIPS Agreement: An 
Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement in Relation to the Right to Health 254 (2012), and Kenny, E.D., “The 
International Human Right to Health: What Does This Mean for Our Nation and World?” 34 Indiana Law Review 1457, 
1475 (2001).  
190 International law provides that although a State may legitimately object to a rule of customary international law 
when it is created, a State is bound by the customary international law once it has lifted its objections. See generally, 
Quince, C., The Persistent Objector and Customary International Law, Outskirts Press: Parker, CO, USA (2010). As 
the right to health is arguably a rule of customary international law once the US ended its persistent objection by 
admitting the right, it is bound by it. 
191 Committee on the Effect of Climate Change on Indoor Air Quality and Public Health of the US Institute of 
Medicine, Climate Change, the Indoor Environment and Health, National Academies Press: Washington, D.C., USA 
(August 2011). 
192 Ibid at 244. 
193 Ibid 
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adaptation and often even loss and damage as the harm has become impossible to avoid. And, the 
final and third guiding principle in the American study is to improve the collection of data to ensure 
better informed decision making.194 Linked to the first principle, this is an important, but conditional 
principle. For developing countries this is an issue of demanding that developed States fulfil their 
obligations to provide financing, capacity-building and technology transfer to developing countries. 
Thus while countries that have achieved the level of social and economic development may have 
the internal resources to put adequate data collections structures in place, many developing 
countries do not yet have adequate resources. Moreover, the resources they have must be diverted to 
more urgent concerns. This brief comparison of three suggested priorities for American policy 
makers serves as a stark reminder of the unequal manner in which climate change will adversely 
impact the health of especially small island States inhabitants and inhabitants from other developing 
States. 
 
The failure to adequately address health in the Draft Agreement appears to follow the same logic as 
the American study just discussed. It is based on priorities that are apparently biased towards the 
interests of those States that already have the resilience to adapt to the most serious health 
consequences of climate change. States that do not have the resources necessary for adequate 
adaptation are significantly disadvantaged.  
 
Sustainable development 
 
The relationship between resilience to the adverse effects of climate change and countries’ social 
and economic development is the foundation of the Rio Declaration from 1992. It is also 
fundamental to the UNFCCC as reflected by the principle of CBDR that is imbedded through the 
Convention.195 Ensuring their development was perhaps the major concern of developing States in 
1992. Especially Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the negotiating block of the Alliance 
of Small Island States (AOSIS) in the climate talks, have seen the Rio treaties as a way to fight back 
into the development ring from which their special circumstances were otherwise being excluded.196 
Today, the concerns of AOSIS remain as few island States have graduated to the level of developed 
States economically, island States continue to face particularly damaging adverse effects of climate 
change, and developed States continue to marginalise the particularities of island States in relation 
to the obligation of developed States to provide finance, capacity building, and adequate access to 
technology to these States. 
 
In the current agreement, almost every effort by the G77 and China to ensure the preferential 
treatment of developing States in order to secure their development for the future, was refuted and 
objected to with brackets or options that include “no text”. The current state of negotiations of the 
Draft Agreement therefore does little to address the concerns of developing States that their 
development will be handicapped by the actions they are being asked to agree to take without 
guarantees of adequate finance, capacity building, or technology. For example, the Statement in 
article 2bis that “[t]he extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement this 
Agreement will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their 
commitments on provision of finance, technology development and transfer and capacity-building”, 
was met with a call for “no text” at all by developed countries.  
 
Developing countries downplayed the concerns of developing countries during ADP 2.11. For 
example, the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, a cooperation agency for 
                                                
194 Ibid 
195 See, for example, art. 3 and 4, UNFCCC (article 3, para. 1, expressly states the principle, while article 4 relies on the 
principle for the expression of the commitments of States). 
196 See Stoutenberg, J.G., Disappearing Island States in International Law 17-30 (2015). 
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developed countries, claimed that the climate finance goals of 100 billion would be met, as a report 
launched during ADP 2.11 claimed that US$ 62 billion had already been mobilised.197 The claims 
made in this report have since been shown to be misleading by some evaluators198 and they appear 
contradicted by the fact that Green Climate Fund, the primary vehicle for providing climate finance 
under the UNFCCC, apparently has less than US$ 5 billion in its coffers.199 
 
If the proposal of developing States for article 2bis, paragraph 2, were adopted this would be a 
significant step towards building trust between the G77 and China on the one side and the United 
States, European Union and its allies on the other side. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
As the comments on the several areas above indicate, not only must all States be involved at the 
global level to adequately address the adverse effects of climate change, but the will of States must 
be cultivated to a level that it will bear fruit for their people. This has not yet happened. The Draft 
Agreement to be agreed in Paris in December 2015 does not appear to contain language to ensure 
adequate action.  
 
The main flaw of the Draft Agreement is still its repeated references to alternatives or options of 
“shall,” “should,” and “other” that reflect a lack of consensus on large parts of the text and almost 
all the crucial elements. This ambiguity or failure to agree, sometimes even to reiterate existing 
legal obligations, threatens to undermine any chance of achieving consensus. It is also troubling that 
some topics such as health, human rights, and an accountability mechanism like a climate justice 
court or tribunal are not mentioned. Although some of these are mentioned in the Draft COP21 
Decision, their exclusion from the Draft Agreement is a disquieting sign that States do not intend to 
build on or strengthen the UNFCCC.  
 
The consequences of our failure will be deadly for many of the most vulnerable people on the 
planet. Among these are the indigenous peoples, many of whom have lived and prospered in an 
entirely sustainable manner on the planet they call Mother Earth or Pachamama.200 There are also 
the women and children who are vulnerable because of their youth or due to the disproportionate 
burden of the adverse effects of climate change they will have to bear. There are the people of 
Africa who could perish by the hundreds of millions without the resources to make themselves 
resilient. And there are the people of the Pacific region who may be the first to feel the harm of 
climate change if a recent publication is correct in pointing out that “[i]t is clear that the effects of 
climate change are expected to intensify across the Pacific region in the coming decades.”201 
                                                
197 OECD, “Climate finance in 2013-14 and the USD 100 billion goal,” a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development in collaboration with Climate Policy Initiative (2015) accessed at 
http://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/OECD-CPI-Climate-Finance-Report.htm (7 October 2015).  
198 Williams, M., “TWN Climate Info: A Preliminary Review of the OECD/CPI Report, "Climate Finance in 2013-14 
and the USD 100 Billion goal,” Third World Network: Malaysia (30 October 2015) accessed at 
http://www.twn.my/title2/climate/info.service/2015/cc151004.htm (31 October 2015). 
199 This figure is arrived at based on a review of GCF Doc. GCF/B.10/08 (26 June 2015), which states that “[t]he Fund 
has secured US$ 10 billion equivalent in pledges from 33 countries so far,” but that of the pledging countries only 22 
have signed contribution agreements or arrangements for a total of US$ 5.47 billion equivalent (p. 4). Although the 
report is silent on the matter, it can be assumed that even less money has actually been paid into the Fund.. 
200 Pachamama is an indigenous god presiding over the fertility of the Earth in Inca Mythology. 
201 Park, C.-Y., Raitzer, D.A., Samson, J.N.G., Halili, P.R.M., “Climate Change and Adaptation Challenges in the 
Pacific,” at 205, 223 in Filho, W.L., (ed.), Climate Change in the Asia-Pacific Region, Springer: Cham, Switzerland 
(2015). 
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COULD VANUATU CLAIM REPARATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR DAMAGES SUSTAINED FROM 
CYCLONE PAM?  
 
CALVY AONIMA AND SHIVANAL KUMAR* 
  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On the 13th of March 2015, a severe tropical cyclone, identified as “Cyclone Pam,” struck the 
Republic of Vanuatu. It was an unprecedented tropical cyclone which left the Republic in total 
devastation.1 It  affected and claimed individual lives, destroyed local food sources, flattened 
many buildings, stripped off trees, broke down communication, ruined infrastructure, and many 
more destructions that to date are yet to be quantified. In an interview,2 the President of the 
Republic of Vanuatu, Mr. Baldwin Lonsdale described Cyclone Pam and its impacts as: 
 
 This is a very devastating cyclone in Vanuatu. I term it as a monster, a monster. It’s a 
 setback for the government and for the people of Vanuatu. After all the development that 
 has taken place, all this development has been wiped out. So it means we will have to 
 start anew again.3 
 
The President further stated that climate change contributed to the destruction in Vanuatu.4 The 
extent of the damage, and the existence of a strong correlation between extreme weather events 
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* Calvy Aonima is the Legal Officer at the Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management, Environment, 
Climate Change and Communications (‘MEIDECC’) in the Kingdom of Tonga and a Master of Laws (LLM) Candidate at the 
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1 It was around 7:00 pm on Friday 13th of March, 2015, that Cyclone Pam landed on Vanuatu’s shores and struck the Republic of 
Vanuatu. The 2006 happiest place on planet earth (see Nic Marks, Saamah Abdallah, Andrew Sims and Sam Thompson, ‘The 
Happy Planet Index (HPI) Report’ New Economic Foundation (online), 2006 
http://b.3cdn.net/nefoundation/54928c89090c07a78f_ywm6y59da.pdf (accessed 24 November 2015)) was devastated by this 
enormous and gigantic super storm. It left an impact that will be recorded in Vanuatu’s history, and be remembered by many Ni-
Vanuatu people, as the most devastating cyclone to have ever struck their country. There were past cyclone experiences in 
Vanuatu, such as cyclone ‘Uma back in 1987, but there was none with the intensity and the ferocity as Cyclone Pam. It was a 
category 5 cyclone - the last of all cyclone categories - and is the strongest tropical cyclone on record in the South Pacific region, 
with wind speeds of up to 170 miles per hour and gusts exceeding 200 miles per hour.  
2 The interview was conducted when President Baldwin Lonsdale attended the United Nations Conference on Disaster Risk 
Reduction held on 16 March 2015 in Sendai, Japan. 
3 ‘AP Interview: Vanuatu president rues cyclone devastation’, The Associated Press (online) 16 March 2015 
http://news.yahoo.com/vanuatu-president-speaks-devastation-cyclone-pam-022602313.html (accessed 22 November 2015).   
4 Peter Walker and Paul Farrell, ‘Cyclone Pam: 24 confirmed dead as Vanuatu president blames climate change’, The Guardian 
(online) 16 March 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/16/vanuatus-president-blames-climate-change-for-
extreme-weather (accessed 13 November 2015); See also Umberto Bacchi, ‘Vanuatu cyclone Pam: President blames climate 
change for ‘monster’ storm’, International Business Times (online) 16 March 2015, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/vanuatu-cyclone-
pam-president-blames-climate-change-monster-storm-1492073.  
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and human-induced climate change,5  triggers the question of whether Vanuatu could claim 
reparation under international law6 for the damages sustained as a result of Cyclone Pam. This 
paper aims to weigh the possibility of pursuing a claim of this nature and how it could be framed 
under the general law of State responsibility with the objective of achieving reparations for the 
damage sustained. It should be noted that Cyclone Pam had also caused significant damage to 
other Pacific Island countries, namely: Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Solomon Islands. However, for 
the purposes of this paper, the scope of this discussion will be confined to Vanuatu.  
 
This paper is divided into four (4) parts. The first part provides a brief overview on the impacts 
of Cyclone Pam on Vanuatu, including how those impacts have affected the enjoyment of 
specific human rights, and how those impacts can be linked to climate change. The second part 
attempts to discuss how to frame a State responsibility claim under international law, so as to 
hold a State liable under international law for the damages sustained from Cyclone Pam. The 
third part discusses the legal consequences of State responsibility. It elaborates on the various 
forms that reparation may take, and addresses which forms may be available to Vanuatu in the 
event a State is held responsible. The fourth part answers the question: could Vanuatu go to 
court--for example, to the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’)--to claim reparations under 
international law for the damages sustained from Cyclone Pam. This is then followed up by the 
conclusion and recommendations.  
 
How the impacts of Cyclone Pam affect the enjoyment of specific human rights  
 
Apart from general impact and destruction, this section looks on how the impact of Cyclone Pam 
has interfered with the enjoyment of basic human rights of the people of Vanuatu. To start with, 
it is important to consider the relationship between climate change and human rights. The UN 
Human Rights Council in Resolution 10/4 of 2009 explicitly recognised the relationship between 
climate change and violation of human rights worldwide. Resolution 10/4 states: 
 
 Noting that climate change related impacts have a range of implications, both direct and 
 indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights including, inter alia, the right to life, 
 the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right 
 to self- determination [and] recognizing that while these implications affect individuals 
 and communities around the world, the effects of climate change will be felt most  acutely 
 by those segments of the population that are already in vulnerable situations owing to 
 factors  such as geography, poverty, gender, age, indigenous or minority status and 
 disability.7 
 
The Cyclone Pam case study is a classic reflection of Resolution 10/4. The effects of climate 
change are being felt globally, but affect mostly the world’s poorest nations which have 
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5 Christopher B. Field, et al (eds) Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. 
A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 160 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREX_Full_Report.pdf (accessed 25 November 2015).     
6 In this paper, references to international law refer to public international law (as opposed to private international law). 
7 The United Nations Human Rights Council,  Human Rights and Climate Change, HRC Res 10/4, 10th sess, 41st meeting, 
A/HRC/RES/10/4, (25 March 2009) Recital 8 http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_10_4.pdf 
(accessed 20 November 2015). 
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contributed least to the problem and can do little to respond.8 Vanuatu is among those countries 
that have least contributed to the problem of anthropogenic climate change, but are most 
vulnerable and susceptible to its effects. A few examples of the specific human rights that were 
implicated as a result of Cyclone Pam are briefly summarized as follows:# 
 
! The right to life9 - This right is basic to all human rights and is the ‘supreme right to 
which no derogation is permitted even in times of public emergency’.10 This right 
provides that every human being is entitled to life to which they shall be protected 
under the rule of law and not to be arbitrarily deprived of it. 11 The fact that 11 people 
lost their lives as a result of Cyclone Pam has affected this supreme right and had 
deprived those people of their basic enjoyment of this human right. 
 
! The right to self-determination12 - This is a very important right13 because its 
realization ‘is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of 
individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those [other] 
rights.’14 Cyclone Pam had implications on this right when it left the affected people 
of Vanuatu in a state where they were not free to determine for themselves but to 
solely rely on aid supply for support.15 Also the affected people were denied  their 
freedom to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources as it was wiped out or 
destroyed by Cyclone Pam.16  
 
! The right to water17 - This right is premised on the idea that women and children shall 
enjoy adequate living conditions particularly in relation to housing, sanitation, and 
clean drinking water supply. The impacts of Cyclone Pam had detrimentally affected 
this right when 110,000 people did not have access to safe drinking water,18 and no 
proper sanitation and hygiene as water sources were destroyed and/or contaminated.19   
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8 International Bar Association, Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Change Disruption. Climate Change 
Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report (2014) 34. 
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 
3 January 1976) art 6(1) (‘ICCPR’); See also UNDR, UN Doc A/810, art 3; See also Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu art 
5(1)(a).    
10 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No.14 – Article 6 (Right to life) Nuclear Weapons and the Right to Life  
Twenty-third sess, UN Doc INT/CCPR/GEC/4723 (9 November 1984). 
11 ICCPR art 6(1). 
12 ICCPR art 1; See also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights opened for signature 16 December 
1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) art 1 (‘ICESCR’). 
13 According to The United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No.12: Article 1 (Right to self-determination), 
the right to self-determination is a very important right, as a result, it was placed as Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR 
before all other Articles. 
14 United Nations Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No.12: Article 1 (Right to self-determination), Twenty-
first sess, UN Doc INT/CCPR/GEC/6626 (13 March 1984).  
15 Anthony Funnel, ‘After Pam: Vanuatu struggles to rebuild in cyclone aftermath’ ABC News (Online) 11 August 2015 
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/futuretense/after-pam:-vanuatu-struggles-to-rebuild/6686574 (accessed 24 
November 2015). 
16 Joshua Robertson, ‘Vanuatu disaster: the island hit by an earthquake, a volcano then cyclone Pam’ The Guardian (Online) 17 
March 2015 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/17/vanuatu-disaster-the-island-hit-by-an-earthquake-a-volcano-then-
cyclone-pam (accessed 12 November 2015). 
17 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women opened for signature 1 March 1980, 1249 UNTS 
13, art 14(2)(h); See also Convention on the Rights of the Child  opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 art 
24(2)(c) art 24(2)(c) (‘CRC’).  
18 Health Cluster, ‘Cyclone Pam, Vanuatu’ (Media Release, 28 March 2015)  
http://www.wpro.who.int/southpacific/programmes/health_sector/emergencies/health-cluster-28mar2015.pdf?ua=1 (accessed 12 
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! The right to education20 - This right ensures that education is available and accessible 
to every child. This right was affected when 70% of education facilities were 
destroyed, affecting around 57,000 children across three (3) provinces namely: 
Malampa, Shefa, and Tafea,21 and around 80% of schools affected to some degree22 
throughout the whole of Vanuatu.  
 
! The right to means of subsistence23 - What it means to have this right is that in no 
case may a person be deprived of his or her own means of subsistence. This right was 
affected  by the damage that occurred to the food security and the agriculture sector 
(livestock, fishery, and forestry),24 and the 96% of crops that were destroyed25 which 
left people in certain areas with no alternative food stocks, and in need of immediate 
food, agriculture and likelihood assistance.26 
 
! The right to property27 - This right ensures that everyone has the right to own 
property alone or with others, and shall not be deprived of it.28 As a result of Cyclone 
Pam, the right to property had also been affected by the destruction of household 
goods and properties.29  
 
! The right to a healthy environment30 - This right aims at ensuring that everyone 
enjoys the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.31 This right 
entails improved environmental hygiene32 and the prevention and treatment of 
diseases.33 The enjoyment of this basic human right was implicated when many 
sustained substantial injuries34 and many contracted other sicknesses and diseases as a 
result of Cyclone Pam.  
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November 2015). See also Flash Appeal, ‘Emergency Response Plan For Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone Pam March-June 
2015’(Media Release 24 March 2015) http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Vanuatu-
TCPam_flash_appeal_final%2024MAR2015.pdf (accessed 15 November 2015). 
19 ICESCR art 12(2)(d). 
20 ICESCR art 13; See also CRC art 28(1). 
21 Flash Appeal, above n 18. 
22 UNICEF, ‘Cyclone Pam Humanitarian Situation Report 9’ (Media Release 23 March 2015) 
http://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/UNICEF_Pacific_Cyclone_Pam_SitRep_No_9_23-24_March_2015.pdf (accessed 11 
November 2015). 
23 ICCPR art 1(2); See also ICESCR art 1(2). 
24 Flash Appeal, above n 18. 
25 Ibid. 
26 World Food Programme, ‘Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone Pam - Vanuatu Situation Report #5’ (Media Release 23 March 2015) 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp273075.pdf (accessed 23 November 2015). 
27 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183 plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 
1948) art 17 (‘UDHR’); see also Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu art 5(1)(j). 
28 UDHR art 17. 
29 Flash Appeal, above n 18. 
30 ICESCR art 12. 
31 ICESCR art 12(1). 
32 ICESCR art 12(2)(b). 
33 ICESCR art 12(2)(c). 
34 Health Cluster, above n 18. 
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! The right to adequate and secure housing35 - This right ensures that everyone has the 
adequate standard of living, adequate food, and housing.36 This right was affected 
when 75,000 people were in need of shelter37 as 15,000 houses were either destroyed 
or severely damaged, including the destruction of food, household goods and 
properties.38  
 
This non-exhaustive list above shows not only how the impacts of Cyclone Pam have affected 
the enjoyment of specific human rights in Vanuatu, but reflects how Cyclone Pam had impacted 
Vanuatu as a whole. This may trigger the specific question whether international human rights 
law could serve as, or consolidate, the legal basis of a reparations claim related to Cyclone Pam 
under international law. This claim would similarly involve evidential questions related to the 
link between Cyclone Pam and climate change. However, this paper does not intend to go down 
the human rights path and does not attempt to explicitly examine whether or not human-induced 
climate change is a violation of human rights from an international law perspective, though the 
authors believe it is. Instead, this paper will focus on international climate change law serving as, 
or consolidating, the legal basis of a claim for reparations under international law.  
 
Link between Cyclone Pam and climate change  
 
This section aims to demonstrate that a link can be established between Cyclone Pam and 
climate change. In the abovementioned interview, President Lonsdale, blamed climate change for 
the destruction that occurred in his country. In his exact words, he was quoted as saying: 
  
 w]e see the level of sea rise … the cyclone seasons, the warm, the rain, all this is 
 affected … [t]his year we have more than in any year … yes, climate change is 
 contributing to this [destruction].39 
 
Precisely because this statement has triggered much debate, it is a helpful starting point in 
exploring the possible link between Cyclone Pam and climate change.  To claim reparations for 
Cyclone Pam damage based on climate change-related obligations necessarily involves some 
kind of causation test. In other words, there must be a link between the damage on the one hand 
and climate change on the other. However, it remains unclear what test is contained in 
international law, as there is a lack of international jurisprudence on climate change. For the 
purposes of this paper, the Authors will assume that a moderately stringent causation test will 
need to be met: that climate change materially contributed to the damage. This is an appropriate 
test, as it puts the burden of proving causation on the claimants while the test is not so stringent 
as to make any claim for climate change-related damages impossible.  
In the lead-up to exploring this link, it is important to first recall the overwhelming body of 
scientific evidence which establishes that the emission of anthropogenic greenhouse gases 
(‘GHGs’) is the main cause of climate change. Indeed, by ratifying the United Nations 
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37 Health Cluster, above n 18; See also Flash Appeal, above n 18. 
38 Flash Appeal, above n 18. 
39 Peter Walker and Paul Farrell, above n 4; see also Umberto Bacchi, above n 4.  
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Framework on Climate Change Convention (‘UNFCCC’), States have acknowledged that 
climate change is a result of man-made activities. Article 1 of the UNFCCC stipulates: 
 
 “Climate change” means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to 
 human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in 
 addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.40  
   
With near global ratification of the UNFCCC, virtually all States agree with this notion. This 
notion has been confirmed repeatedly since 1992 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (‘IPCC’),41 including its most recent Fifth Assessment Report (‘AR5’) – which is the 
most comprehensive up-to-date scientific assessment of climate change that represents the 
consensus view of the world’s leading climate scientists. Specifically, AR5 established with a 
95% degree of probability that human activity is the dominant cause of global warming.42 The 
AR5 also stated that warming of the climate is “unequivocal” and evidenced by a range of 
observed events, including higher atmosphere and ocean temperatures; diminished snow and ice 
caps; and rising sea levels.43 This indicates that the scientific evidence on anthropogenic climate 
change is stronger than ever and it is indeed virtually certain that human activity is the primary 
cause of anthropogenic climate change.  
 
This leads us to the question how anthropogenic climate change relates to cyclones in general, or 
to Cyclone Pam in particular. A first point to note is that cyclones have long occurred in the 
Pacific Region, and cyclone activity predates the industrialization period. The claim that climate 
change is the direct cause of a particular cyclone is therefore not plausible. Instead, the evidence 
points at a more indirect relationship. Inferences may be drawn from scientists’ observations44 
that unusually mild sea surface temperatures and added water vapor helped the storm intensify 
before hitting Vanuatu.45 Indeed, in the area where Cyclone Pam intensified, the ocean 
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40 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 4 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into 
force 21 March 1994) art 1 (‘UNFCCC’).   
41 IPCC is the international body for assessing the science related to climate change. The IPCC was set up in 1988 by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to provide policymakers with 
regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate change, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and 
mitigation. See IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Official Website http://www.ipcc.ch/.  
42 The Climate Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Reports: What in it for Small Island 
Developing States? (2014) 2 available at https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/ (accessed 20 November 2015). 
43 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers,(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 2. 
44 See, for example, Christopher B. Field, et al (eds) above n 5 (noting that ‘[a] changing climate leads to changes in th frequency, 
intensity, spatial extent, duration and timing of extreme weather and climate events, and result in unprecedented extreme weather 
duration and timing of extreme weather and climate events’) and Kerry Emmanuel, ‘Severe Tropical Cyclone Pam and Climate 
Change’ Real Climate (online) 2 May 2015, http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2015/03/severe-tropical-cyclone-
pam-and-climate-change ((suggesting that ‘the number of tropical cyclones worldwide could exceed 100 per year by about 2070, 
compared to an average of 90 per year at the moment.’ See further Thomas Knutson et al., Tropical Cyclones and Climate 
Change (2010) 3 Nature Geoscience 157-163) (suggesting that ‘sea surface temperatures in most tropical cyclone formation 
regions have increased by several tenths of a degree Celsius during the past several decades’ and predicting that ‘GHG emissions 
will cause cyclones to shift towards much stronger storms, with intensity increases of 2 to 11% by 2100’) and James P. Kossin 
and Timothy L. Olander and Kenneth R. Knapp, ‘Trend Analysis with a New Global Record of Tropical Cyclone Intensity’ 
(2013) 26 Journal of Climate 9960-9976 (concluding that ‘the intensity of cyclones of all strengths in the South Pacific has 
increased by 2.5 [meters] per second per decade, with the strongest 20% increasing by as much as 5 [meters] per second per 
decade’). Finally, see Yosuke Adachi, ‘Human Lives at Risk Due to Eustatic Sea-Level Rise and Extreme Coastal Flooding in the 
21st Century’ (2015) 7 Weather, Climate, and Society 118-132) (suggesting that ‘sea level rise could cause at least 84 to 139 
extra deaths per year from cyclone-related coastal flooding in the United States by 2100’).  
45 Andrew Freedman, ‘Vanuatu’s president makes a leap in tying Cyclone Pam to Climate Change’ Mashable (Online), 17 March 
2015, http://mashable.com/2015/03/16/vanuatu-cyclone-pam-global-warming/ (accessed 2 November 2015). 
A"#29#
temperature was up to 2 degrees Celsius higher than average for that time of the year (3.6 
degrees Fahrenheit)—which is likely to be attributable at least in part to global warming.46 And 
as a result of sea level rise, the impact of super-Cyclone Pam became even more damaging.47 
 
We may conclude that irrespective of the effects of climate change on the frequency of cyclone 
occurrence, the best available science indicates that climate change-induced increases of sea 
temperatures intensify tropical storms. This means that there is a link between the intensity of 
Cyclone Pam on the one hand and climate change-induced increases of sea surface temperatures 
on the other. In addition, a link can be established between sea level rise and the damage brought 
about by Cyclone Pam in Vanuatu. In sum, Cyclone Pam would not have been as intense and 
damaging as it was if there would not have been climate change.  
 
FRAMING A STATE RESPONSIBILITY CLAIM 
 
General law of State responsibility  
 
This part discusses the general law on State responsibility and its relevance to Vanuatu’s 
potential reparations claim for the damages sustained from Cyclone Pam. The general law of 
State responsibility was codified by the International Law Commission’s (‘ILC’) in its Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ARS’), which are the product of 
more than 40 years of work by ILC on the topic.48 This law is important because the existing 
climate change regime does not address the questions of when, how and by whom climate 
change damage sustained by a State should be compensated. Due to this gap, the “particularly 
vulnerable”49 States have typically asserted that they are justified in seeking compensation from 
States who have emitted most GHGs in the atmosphere; a view which is shared by some 
academic writers who have opined that under international law, ‘States are obliged to 
compensate the directly or indirectly affected States for the damage caused.’50   
  
There exists ‘in any legal system liability for failure to observe obligations imposed by its rules – 
known as responsibility in international law.’51 This is derived from one of the fundamental 
principles of international law that States must not harm or violate the rights of other States.52 
Grounds for claims of responsibility will be created once States fail to observe obligations – 
usually through the breach of one or more of the customary international law obligation(s) or 
because of a breach of a treaty obligation.53 As a result, firstly, States can be held responsible for 
violations of international law; and secondly, States will be obliged to make full reparation for 
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46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 James Crawford and Simon Olleson, ‘The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility’ in Malcolm D. Evans 
(ed), International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 441, 447. 
49 This term refers to States that are mostly developing, and are especially vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change due 
to poor economies, geographical location, and low-lying nature. 
50 Roda Verheyen, ‘‘Establishing State Responsibility for Climate Change Damage’ Climate Change Damage and International 
Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) 52. 
51 DJ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 6th ed, 2004). 
52 Richard S.J. Tol and Roda Verheyen, ‘State responsibility and compensation for climate change damages—a legal and 
economic assessment’ (2004) 32 Energy Policy 1109 https://www.mi.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/fnu-
files/publication/tol/enpolliability.pdf (accessed 17 November 2015) . 
53 Matthew Craven, ‘Statehood, Self-determination, and Recognition’ in Malcolm D. Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 214. 
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the damages caused. Thus, in the absence of a specialised regime governing responsibility and 
liability, the law of State responsibility is ‘applicable to treaty-based and other rules of 
international law to the extent it reflects international customary law.’54 
 
It is important to note that although the ARS are as such not binding on States, most of the 
articles indeed reflect customary international law.55 Therefore, to establish State responsibility, 
Vanuatu will need to venture into detail the relevant articles of the ARS. To start with, the basic 
principle of State responsibility is provided in Article 1 of the ARS which states that ‘[e]very 
internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of that state.’56 
Article 1 of the ARS has been given wide recognition in practice. For example, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) ‘affirmed in the Phosphates in Morocco Case that 
international responsibility is established immediately if a [S]tate has committed an 
internationally wrongful act against another [S]tate.’57 Article 2 of the ARS stipulates that:   
 
 There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action 
 or omission: 
 
  (a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and 
  (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.58 
 
Crawford and Olleson hold that ‘the fulfillment of these conditions is a sufficient basis for 
international responsibility, as has been consistently affirmed by international courts and 
tribunals.’59 The implication of this basic principle is that Vanuatu needs to show that a State has 
committed an internationally wrongful act (i.e. action or omission) by breaching an international 
obligation attributable to that State in order to make a successful State responsibility claim. Of 
course, this involves identifying a State that could be held responsible.    
  
Which State could be held responsible?  
 
Determining who to sue is one of the greatest challenges involved in a State responsibility claim 
related to a climate change- phenomenon. One could argue that in practice, almost every State is 
responsible for at least some GHG emitting activities and therefore selecting one State  over 
another is almost impossible. And as it currently stands, there is no international law on how to 
apportion damages between multiple wrongdoers or causes of climate change.60 However, it 
should be noted that Vanuatu could likely bring a State responsibility claim against a State or 
States, without being able to identify one GHG emitter who is responsible for the specific 
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54 Ann-Charlotte Rosenblom, Claiming State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages (Masters Thesis, University of Lund, 
2009) 38, available at http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1561576&fileOId=1565681 (accessed 
18 November 2015). 
55 Even before their adoption, the articles were cited in decisions made by the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’). The United 
Nations General Assembly has commended in resolution 56/83 that States give attention to the ARS, and annexed the articles to 
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56 International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 
2001, GA Res 56/83 (‘Commentaries on ILC ARS’). 
57 Ann-Charlotte Rosenblom, above n 54, 31; See also Phosphates in Morocco Case (1938) P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 74. 
58 International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art 2 (‘ILC ARS’). 
59 James Crawford and Simon Olleson, above n 48, 451. 
60 Roda Verheyen, above n 50, 297.  
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damages caused by Cyclone Pam. Indeed, international jurisprudence suggests that Vanuatu 
could make a claim against any one wrongdoing State or against several States, as long as the 
judgment does not affect the interests of a third State not party to the proceedings.61 The 
implication is that Vanuatu could claim against States in breach of their obligations under the 
UNFCCC or their reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC (‘Kyoto 
Protocol’), where ‘[t]he breach of the obligation would itself constitute the required fault and no 
further negligence needs to be shown.62 This makes it unnecessary to ‘apportion’ responsibility – 
Vanuatu could just pick one obvious culprit and let that State sue others if it is found responsible, 
or Vanuatu could claim against all States that appear to be in breach of their obligations. 
 
Attributing activities to a State  
 
After identifying the State to sue, the next step is for Vanuatu to attribute activities to the State. 
Chapter II of the ARS (Articles 4 – 11) provides the circumstances in which activities can be 
attributed to a State.63 In relation to cases concerning climate change damage being mostly the 
acts of those of private corporations and individuals, Article 8 of ASR provides that ‘the conduct 
of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State…if the person or group of 
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State 
carrying out the conduct.’64 This Article implies that once an activity has been licensed, it is 
deemed to be under the control of the State. Moreover, Article 11 states that any conduct of 
private persons or private entities is to be considered an act of that State once the State in 
question acknowledges or accepts the conduct as its own.65 According to Verheyen, since the 
biggest emission activities like transport and electricity are subject to licensing, as such once a 
State approves the behavior, through permitting policies in that regard, that State is explicitly or 
implicitly responsible for GHG emissions of private entities.66 This was ruled by the Tribunal in 
Trail Smelter Case,67 thus both Articles 8 and 11 are reflective of international case law.68 ‘The 
ICJ has considered attribution by omission in similar terms in cases like Corfu Chanel Case, the 
Tehran Hostage Case, Nauru Case and Nicaragua Case’.69  
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61 This is exemplified in the Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, Nauru v Australia, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, [1992] 
ICJ Rep 240. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, 14. See further Joy-Dee Davis, State Responsibility for Global Climate Change: The Case 
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62 Eva Hostettler, ‘State Responsibility and Climate Change’ (Paper presented at the Summer Academy, United Nations 
University Institute for Environment and Human Security, 2008) available at https://www.ehs.unu.edu/article/read/574 (accessed 
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65 Ibid. 
66 Roda Verheyen, above n 50. 
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Obligations  
 
Paragraph (b) of Article 2 of the ARS provides that internationally wrongful acts of a State (i.e. 
action or omission) must constitute a breach of an international obligation of that State. Vanuatu 
would, therefore, need to identify the obligations that are legally binding on a State at the time 
the alleged wrongful act was committed. International obligations may derive from any source of 
international law. The four main sources can be found in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice70 and of these, as suggested above, international conventions 
(treaties) and customary international law are the most relevant in the context of climate change.  
 
Relevant international conventions include but are not limited to, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol. The principle pacta sunt servanda is the basis for the binding nature of treaties71 as 
reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’). Article 26 of the 
VCLT states that ‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed 
by them in good faith.’72  
 
Relevant obligations can also be derived from Customary international law. Customary 
international law is developed out of two main elements: ‘an established, widespread, and 
consistent practice on the part of the States; and a psychological element known as the opinio 
juris sive necessitatis ...’73 – which basically reflects the belief of States that behaviour is 
prohibited or prescribed by international law.74 Customary international law is in principle 
binding on all States, except for States that are “persistent objectors” to the rule in question. In 
the context of climate change, the no-harm rule is an important rule of customary international 
law. Indeed, the rule can be interpreted as giving rise to an obligation for States to protect the 
climate system--which naturally extends to areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
 
Obligations derived from the UNFCCC  
 
For the purpose of claiming reparations for climate change damage, it is necessary to examine 
the obligations contained in the lex specialis of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. The 
UNFCCC has near universal ratification and the commitments contained therein suggest that the 
Parties have a legal duty to avoid dangerous climate change.75 The Kyoto Protocol on the other 
hand sets forth legally enforceable targets for industrialized countries, which are listed in Annex 
I.76 Thus, each of these instruments entail obligations for States to limit and stabilize their GHG 
emissions in the atmosphere.  
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There is an ongoing debate amongst commentators as to whether or not the UNFCCC contains 
substantive commitments. The UNFCCC is described as a “law making”77 treaty by some, while 
others perceive it as devoid of legal rights and obligations.78 For instance, Okamatsu argued that 
being a framework convention, the UNFCCC does not define specific rights and obligations.79 
On the other end of the spectrum, Voight argues that it ‘…is defendable that the objective of the 
UNFCCC is to provide a duty of prevention with regard to dangerous climate change’.80 
Bodansky on the other hand is neutral on this debate and suggests that the UNFCCC ‘lies 
somewhere between a framework and a substantive convention’,81 and establishes more 
extensive commitments than other framework conventions.82  
 
Article 2 of the UNFCCC establishes the “ultimate” objective of the Convention which is ‘… to 
achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent “dangerous” 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ 83 We suggest that the phrase “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” must be interpreted as meaning if and when 
the “adverse effects of climate change” occur.84 According to Article 1 of the UNFCCC, the 
definition of “adverse impacts of climate change” is when “significant deleterious effects” occur 
in the environment or biodata.85 In this context, it is ‘reasonable to say that the term dangerous 
refers to adverse effects of climate change which have significant deleterious effects on 
composition of ecosystems, human health and welfare’.86 Moreover, the term “objective” may be 
used interchangeably with the phrase “object and purpose”87 on the basis that the term “ultimate” 
is used as a qualification.88 The objective therefore ‘acknowledges climate change as a problem 
and helps legitimize it as a matter of international concern.’89 Article 2 also explicitly endorses 
“preventive principle”, which requires State Parties to control various activities that may pose 
risk and cause environmental damage, as embodied in the Trail Smelter Case90 where the 
tribunal ordered Canada to prevent future injury.91 Although the exact meaning of Article 2 may 
be subject to controversy, its inclusion as a separate article in the operational part of the treaty 
suggests that it gives rise to legal obligations. Indeed, as Verheyen has emphasised, Article 2 is 
contained in the operative part of the treaty and provides for an environmental quality standard 
by setting a threshold for the UNFCCC and all future legal instruments.92 According to 
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Verheyen, the term “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” provides a 
normative threshold and the time-element for this threshold is provided in the second sentence.93 
 
In addition, Article 4(2) contains more specific obligations for industrialised States: as Voight 
puts it, this Article ‘can be interpreted as entailing a concrete obligation for industrialized Parties 
or Annex 1 Parties to reduce their GHG emissions, thus complementing the objective.’94 It 
requires that all the UNFCCC Parties:   
 
adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate 
change, by limiting its anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gas and protecting and 
enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will 
demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends 
in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the convention…95  
 
However, like Article 2 of UNFCCC, Article 4(2) remains controversial and there is no 
consensus as to its proper interpretation. Christian Reus-Smit stated that: 
 
 At the Earth Summit in 1992, many environmental organisations (NGOs) were highly 
 critical of the “soft” legal form in which the commitments were expressed. The notable 
 absence of any binding timetable or targets for greenhouse gas emissions reduction in the 
 1992 document … was widely seen as a failure of commitment.96 
 
A contrasting perspective which is, in our view, more sensible is taken by Voigt, who states that 
Article 4(2) of UNFCCC ‘when interpreted in a teleological way in the light of the objective of 
the Convention sets forth an “obligation of conduct” to reverse the long term trend of ever-
increasing [GHG] emissions’.97 This perspective makes sense, as the conduct prescribed by 
Article 4(2) is paramount in stabilising atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at safe levels. 
Similarly, Verheyen proposes that Article 4(2) requires Annex 1 Parties to modify their long-
term trends of trends of GHG emissions;98 a view that is supported by three arguments. Firstly, 
all Parties are bound by the objective set out in Article 2 of the Convention;99 secondly, Annex 1 
Parties are committed under Article 4(2) to take the lead in mitigation measures;100 and thirdly, 
Annex 1 Parties must ensure that a modification of GHG trends is consistent with the objective 
in Article 4(2).101 Based on these arguments, it can indeed be concluded that Article 4(2) of the 
UNFCCC in conjunction with Article 2 obliges all Annex I State Parties to secure the 
stabilisation of atmospheric concentration GHGs through various actions and adoption of 
policies and other measures. This conclusion is supported by the term “shall” in Article 4(2), 
which confirms, in our view, that Article 4(2) does entail a substantive legal obligation.   
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Thus in establishing a wrongful act, Articles 2 and 4(2)—taken together--can be understood as a 
primary rule that has been breached by Annex I Parties who have failed to act in accordance with 
that rule—for example, Annex 1 States that have increased their emissions since the ratification 
of the UNFCCC,102 and presumably every Annex I State that has failed to make the deep 
emission cuts required to prevent dangerous climate change. According to Verheyen, a Claimant 
State may refer to the inadequacy of the respondent State’s climate action plans in the quest to 
prove that a breach has occurred.103 In support of this argument, reference can be made to Article 
18 of the VCLT which provides that a State is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the 
object and purpose of a treaty it has signed.104 Furthermore, Article 31(1) of the VCLT could 
possibly be used to further support the above argument since it requires a treaty to ‘be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.’105 In that context, the lack of compliance 
with a treaty obligation, for example, the lack of compliance with Article 2 and 4(2) of 
UNFCCC, will result in the defeat of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC. Therefore, it may 
amount to an internationally wrongful act to which a State can be held responsible.  
 
Finally, it is important to note also that almost all Parties to the UNFCCC are also Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, this does not mean that the latter has superseded the former. The 
Kyoto Protocol itself reaffirms the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC and was never meant to 
lower standards contained in the Convention. In fact, it provides quantified targets and 
compliance mechanism to facilitate accountability within the UNFCCC regime. The existence of 
this accountability regime does not mean that no State responsibility can arise when Article 4(2) 
is violated. After all, Article 4(2) has never been amended and continues to be binding on all the 
Annex 1 Parties.  
 
Obligations derived from customary international law (i.e. the no-harm rule)  
 
For the purpose of claiming reparations for climate change damage under the law of State 
responsibility, it is useful also to examine the obligations deriving from customary international 
law. As noted above, most relevant to climate change is the no-harm rule. In its advisory opinion 
241 (1996) on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ has confirmed that the 
no-harm rule is part of international customary law and therefore encompasses a legally binding 
obligation for all States.106 The no-harm rule was first applied in the Trail Smelter Case,107 where 
the Tribunal held that: 
 
 Under the principles of international law ... no State has the right to use or permit the use 
 of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of 
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 another or the property of others therein, when the case is of serious consequence and 
 the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.108  
  
Following the Trail Smelter Case,109 the no-harm rule has been entrenched as a well-established 
principle or rule of customary international law and was reflected in numerous international 
instruments110 which includes, for instance, Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration which 
stipulates: 
 States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
 international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
 environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
 jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
 areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.111  
 
More relevant to the purpose of this paper, is the mentioning of the no-harm rule in recital 8 of 
the Preamble of the UNFCCC which is quite similar to Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration. Recital 8 of the Preamble states: 
 
 Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
 the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
 pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to 
 ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
 environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.112  
  
In light of the above, a State’s engagement in GHG emission activities within its national 
territory with the potential to cause damage to other States beyond its national territory would 
trigger obligations under the no-harm rule to avoid such damage. Conversely, Vanuatu can argue 
that it has the right not to be harmed by the acts and omissions of other States. The standard of 
care here is crucial: it appears that establishing a violation of the no-harm rule involves 
demonstrating that a responsible State has failed to exercise ‘due diligence’ in regulating and 
controlling its GHG activities within its own national territory. According to current literature, 
due diligence is said to comprise at least the following elements: foreseeability or knowledge that 
a certain activity could lead to transboundary damage;113 the opportunity to act or prevent;114 and 
proportionality in the choice of measures required to prevent harm or minimize risk.115 In 
addition, the no-harm rule does not only obligate a State to prevent trans-boundary harm but also 
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to limit the risk of such harm occurring.116 This is evident from the ILC’s commentary to the 
2001 Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities which noted:  
 
 that acting with due diligence requires a State to take unilateral measures to prevent 
 significant transboundary harm or at any event minimize the risk thereof… Such 
 measures include, first, formulating policies designed to prevent significant 
 transboundary harm or to minimize the risk thereof and, second implementing those 
 policies. Such policies are expressed in legislation and administrative regulations and 
 implemented through various enforcement mechanisms.117 
  
Accordingly, if Vanuatu can show that despite a responsible State foreseeing that GHG activities 
would lead to significant transboundary harm, that State failed to act with due care or failed to 
take reasonable and proportionate measures to protect the environment from transboundary 
harm, that State may be considered to have breached the no-harm rule. A classic example of how 
the no-harm rule can be formulated in Vanuatu’s favour is reflected in the recent Case 
Concerning the Aerial Herbicide Spraying (Ecuador v Colombia) before the ICJ. This concerned 
a dispute where Ecuador alleged that the aerial spraying of toxic herbicides by Colombia into 
Ecuador’s territory had caused serious damage to people, plants and the environment.118 Ecuador 
requested, amongst other things, a declaration that Colombia had breached an international 
obligation and an order obliging it to ‘...take all steps necessary to prevent, on any part of its 
territory, the use of any toxic herbicides in such a way that they could be deposited onto the 
territory of Ecuador; and (iii) prohibit the use, by means of aerial dispersion, of such herbicides 
in Ecuador, or on or near any part of its border with Ecuador.’119 This case illustrates how 
Vanuatu could formulate its argument in light of the no-harm rule. 
 
LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Duty to cease the wrongful conduct  
 
Article 30 of the ARS provides that a State that is responsible for an internationally wrongful act 
is under an obligation to cease the act if the act is continuing,120 and to offer appropriate 
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.121 According to Paragraph 5 of the commentary to 
Article 30 of the ARS, ‘the function of cessation is to put an end to a violation of international 
law and to safeguard the continuing validity and effectiveness of the underlying rule’.122 In 
framing a State responsibility claim related to climate change damage, Vanuatu may seek and 
demand another State to cease the action or inaction that leads to the emission of dangerous 
levels of GHGs into the atmosphere. For appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition, Paragraph 11 of the commentary to Article 30 of the ARS provides that they are 
concerned with the restoration of confidence on a continuing relationship.123 Vanuatu may seek 
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assurances which in practice are normally given verbally,124 while preventive measures, such as 
repealing of legislation, may be sought as guarantees of non-repetition.125    
 
Duty to make reparations  
 
In addition to cessation and non-repetition, there is a duty to make reparations. One of the most 
important principle of public international law is that ‘the breach of an engagement involves an 
obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.’126 According to Crawford and Olleson, 
‘[r]eparation therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and 
there is no necessity for this to be stated in the Convention itself.’127 Also, the underlying 
principle is that reparations must wipe out the consequences of the breach; in other words, it 
must ‘put the parties as far as possible in the same position as they would have been if the breach 
had not occurred.’128 
 
Article 31 of the ARS captures this principle and states that a State is obliged to make full 
reparation for any injury caused.129 The commentaries on the ARS reiterate that it is a well-
established principle in international law – as established by the PCIJ in the 1927 Chorzow 
Factory Case.130 The PCIJ stated that ‘[i]t is a principle of international law, and even a general 
conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation 
…’.131 The Court also stated that: 
 
… reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum 
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, 
of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or 
payment in place of it – such are the principles which should serve to determine the 
amount of compensation due for an act contrary to international law.132 
 
Article 34 of ASR envisages that ‘[f]ull reparation for the injury caused… shall take the form of 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination …’.133 In the context 
of injury caused by Cyclone Pam, it is impossible to restore the situation ex ante—especially, 
deaths caused by Cyclone Pam are irreversible. Therefore, the two appropriate remedies in this 
case are actions aimed at preventing further damage and compensation for already occurred 
damage. Indeed, it would appear that compensation is the only possible redress for unavoidable 
damage caused by extreme weather events.  
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While the ASR defines injury as “damage whether material or moral”, in practice, this has not 
been so. In the Trail Smelter Case,134 the tribunal awarded compensation to the United States 
only for damage to land and property caused by emissions from a Canadian Smelter.135 The 
ecological damage or “pure” environmental damage caused by Cyclone Pam may not be 
compensable in this case and thus compensation that will actually be received may be limited to 
financially assessable damage i.e. injury to persons and property only, also known as 
consequential environmental damage. It should also be considered that Vanuatu has also emitted 
GHGs to some extent, although a negligible amount. As such, Vanuatu might also be partly 
responsible for the climate change damage, and thus the extent of the reparation must be adjusted 
accordingly.136 This issue is regulated in Article 39 of ASR which states that ‘[i]n the 
determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the contribution to the injury by wilful or 
negligent action or omission of the injured State … in relation to whom reparation is sought.’137 
 
HOW COULD VANUATU ENFORCE THESE LAWS? 
 
Article 42 of the ARS provides that an injured State is entitled to the implementation of State 
responsibility.138 This means, amongst other things, that Vanuatu as an injured State is entitled to 
invoke the responsibility of a responsible State or States. In invoking the responsibility of 
responsible States, Vanuatu shall give notice of its claim to the responsible State or States and 
specify in particular, (i) what measures the responsible State should take in order to cease the 
wrongful act, and (ii) the form of reparation that Vanuatu may elect to seek. This could be done 
either bilaterally (between States) or by bringing a case before an international judicial body, 
such as the ICJ. Our contribution focuses on the latter option.  
 
Bringing a case to the ICJ  
 
According to Article 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ, State parties may deposit at any time 
declarations recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Such declarations may be made 
conditional or unconditional. When made unconditional, the case is straightforward. However, 
when made conditional, it means a State has accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction but 
subject to reservations. Within such reservations, States tend to exclude certain types of disputes, 
which they wish not to sue upon, or be sued upon. However, the easiest way for Vanuatu would 
be to sue a State that has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory. It is important to note 
that most Annex 1 countries have recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, based on 
reciprocity.139 The real obstacle is that Vanuatu has not recognised the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction yet, which probably bars it from bringing a claim regarding Cyclone Pam. On that 
note, if Vanuatu accepts the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory, it could probably bring this 
type of claim in the future. This is not to suggest that there might not be other avenues Vanuatu 
could pursue to invoke responsibility—the ICJ is not the only forum, and indeed Vanuatu could 
invoke responsibility simply by having its Head of State or Minister of Foreign Affairs make a 
statement to that end. 
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This paper has discussed whether or not Vanuatu could successfully claim reparations under 
international law for the damages sustained as a result of Cyclone Pam. It has demonstrated that 
making a successful reparations claim is not impossible. Despite the absence of an existing 
climate change regime that would address the questions of when, how and by whom climate 
change related damages should or could be compensated, the general law on State responsibility 
can help frame a State responsibility claim. Should Vanuatu decide to bring this type of claim, 
Vanuatu could pick one obvious culprit and let that State sue others if it is found responsible, or 
Vanuatu could claim against all States that appear to be in breach of their obligations. However, 
to be able to proceed, Vanuatu may need to recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ 
based on reciprocity. Also, if Vanuatu is to rely on international human rights law as a legal basis 
for its claim, Vanuatu, may need to consider becoming a State party to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’). Lastly, as it stands, the current 
jurisprudence on this subject area is yet to be further developed. Therefore, there is a need for a 
case of this nature to be litigated in order to shed more light and expand the jurisprudence in this 
area. Who knows, this Vanuatu Cyclone Pam case, if litigated, may set the precedent.   
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A BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE 
LEGAL BASIS FOR REPARATIONS FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE-DAMAGES AND INJURIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  CASE STUDY OF HA’APAI 
ISLANDS (TONGA) FOLLOWING CYCLONE IAN 
 
Fitilagi Ioane Fa’anunu* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The people of small communities of the Ha’apai island group in Tonga became victims of the 
severe tropical cyclone Ian in 2014 resulting in damage to property, threats to livelihoods and 
food security, and loss of life.  This article looks at a range of human rights of these 
communities that were, it is argued, violated. This is demonstrated by linking interference 
with rights to States’ obligations under international climate change laws and human rights 
frameworks that give rise to further obligations to compensate the Ha’apai people as 
beneficiaries of those rights.  The article recognises that a claim for compensation may be 
futile against claims that it is difficult to establish liability whereby no single emitter of 
carbon dioxide can be linked to a specific result such as a tropical cyclone. The article argues 
that the IPCC reports coupled with Tonga’s climatological records may sufficiently establish 
liability on the basis that climate change has at least partially contributed to tropical cyclones 
by means of its influence over weather and climate events resulting in severe tropical 
cyclones like Ian.  It is also recognised that a claim by the Ha’apai communities as a people, 
by virtue of their right to self-determination, may be challenged.  However, a claim of this 
kind will stand the test of time in the relevant forums. 
 
The first part of this article highlights the reality of the impact of the cyclone on the Ha’apai 
affected communities as well as the causal link between man-made climate change and 
extreme climate events.  The subsequent sections discuss and analyse the legal issues 
addressed in this article and the selected rights of the Ha’apai people as recognised under 
human rights laws as well as the conduct of States that interfere with them.  Evidence is also 
presented to provide context for the reality of the small and vulnerable communities of 
Ha’apai.  The article then suggests that a human rights based approach should be considered 
to enhance actions to and responses against climate change. This should reflect 
comprehensively and extensively in the new agreement to be agreed and adopted in Paris in 
order to achieve the object of the UNFCCC and thus safeguard fundamental human rights of 
vulnerable communities now and in the future. 
 
WHAT HAPPENED IN HA’APAI? 
 
Tonga is extremely vulnerable to natural disasters.  It is ranked second to Vanuatu in the 
world as being one of the highest risk areas for being exposed to disasters resulting from 
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extreme natural events including droughts, tsunamis, earthquakes and tropical cyclones.1  It is 
affected by tropical cyclones, on average, once annually, and increasing to two during El 
Nino years.2 The Ha’apai islands are located just north of Tongatapu Island, the main island 
of the Kingdom of Tonga where the government is situated.  
 
On the afternoon of 11 January 2014, tropical cyclone Ian (category 5), made landfall on the 
islands of Ha’apai and causing havoc in the northern smaller islands of the Ha’apai group: 
Uiha, Uoleva, Foa, Ha’ano and Mo’unga’one.3   Of the 6,616 people inhabiting the islands of 
Ha’apai,4 950 of the households were directly affected and suffered severe damage to 
property and livelihoods.5  Cyclone damage to Tonga’s agriculture and fisheries sectors 
exceeded US$20 million.6  This raised many concerns for the Ha’apai group whose 
communities depend primarily on agriculture and fisheries for their livelihoods.7  Of the 950 
households affected, about 22 percent were dependent on fishing alone as their main source 
of income.8  About 2000 people were displaced and housed in emergency shelters when their 
homes were either severely or completely destroyed and, fortunately, only one death was 
reported.9  Those whose homes were destroyed were fortunate to find safe shelter in Mormon 
Church buildings whilst others resorted to breaking open their own cement water tanks used 
for drinking as the only option available to them for safe shelter.  While destroying their 
water tanks provided shelter during the cyclone, many families were subsequently crippled 
due to a lack of drinking water which was collected in the tanks as many rely on rainwater for 
drinking on the islands.10  This in turn led to the fear of disease due to contaminated drinking 
water and the fact people were already suffering from the prevailing drought that began in 
Tonga some months prior to the arrival of tropical cyclone Ian.11   
 
The tourism sector also suffered considerable damage to infrastructure and loss of revenue 
due to cancelled bookings.12  With only 12 hotels and motels on the island, one of them was 
completely flattened by raging winds in excess of a 100 knots leaving only rubble and cement 
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foundations behind.  The loss and damage to the tourism sector not only impacted the 
households but also the community whose source of income derived from visiting tourists 
through the purchase of handicrafts and agricultural produce sold at the market resulting in 
diminished  wages for those employed at  tourist facilities.13  The lack of water, loss of 
electricity and telephone lines and damage to tourist facilities meant that businesses would 
take a long time to recover.  In fact, the Tongan economy over-all was generally affected 
because the expenditures to rebuild Ha’apai meant that other State priorities had to be put on 
hold.14 
 
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE? 
 
Causal link with Climate Change 
 
This section attempts to show the causal link between climate change and extreme climate 
events, including tropical cyclones.  It is based on the IPCC reports that acknowledge the 
effects of climate change resulting from the accumulated greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the 
atmosphere.   The reports also note that ocean basins have been warmed the most, and the 
warming of the ocean is critical to the formation of tropical cyclones.  It is argued here that 
climate change influences tropical cyclones like Ian and indeed contributed to the damages 
which the Ha’apai people have suffered.  What is clear is that the developed countries, based 
on historical emissions, are largely responsible for the impacts of climate change that are 
being experienced today15 and thus the influence of climate change on tropical cyclones may 
be sufficiently supported to establish liability against developed countries under international 
law.  However, it is usually argued that no single nation and its emissions could contribute to 
a particular cyclone, hence causation would be too remote.16 It is important to note that the 
number of severe cyclones based on their average maximum wind speeds that have affected 
Tonga have occurred in the last two decades and thus in the time frame since the adverse 
effects of man-made climate change began to materialise.17   
 
The IPCC confirmed in its Assessment Reports18 that there are changes in the Earth’s energy 
budget owing to both natural and anthropogenic substances and processes resulting in climate 
change.19  It also confirmed that the largest contribution to this change is by the increase of 
atmospheric concentration of carbon-dioxide (CO2) caused by human activities20 since 
1750.21   It also highlights specifically that ‘[the observed changes] in climate extremes 
reflect the influence of anthropogenic climate change in addition to natural climate 
variability…’22 
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IPCC further linked the changing climate as influencing weather and climate events to 
disasters23  that adversely impact24on the exposure25 and vulnerability26 of human society and 
natural ecosystems.27 Weather and extreme events include more intense tropical cyclones 
with higher average maximum wind speeds and more frequent28 droughts.  Sea level rise and 
increasing sea surface temperatures are critical concerns for tropical Small Island States 
(SIDS) including Tonga.29  To quote the IPCC Special Report on Managing Risks of Extreme 
Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: 
 
A changing climate leads to changes in frequency, intensity, spatial extent, 
duration and timing of extreme weather and climate events, and can result in 
unprecedented extreme weather and climate events.30 
 
These findings add to the existing understanding about this relationship.  That is, the 
changing climate influences sea surface temperatures as a critical ingredient for cyclone 
formation.31  The IPCC Third Assessment Report noted that peak wind and precipitation 
intensity of tropical cyclones would increase in some areas.32  But it could not confirm if all 
regions would be affected the same way due to limited data at the time.33  This in fact was 
consistent with a statement by the World Meteorological Organizations (WMO) in 2006 
resulting from its Sixth International Workshop on Tropical Cyclones in San Jose, Costa 
Rica.34  It stated that: (1) it was well established observationally that over the past several 
decades the sea surface temperature over most tropical ocean basins had increased in 
magnitude by between 0.25 – 0.5 degrees celcius; (2) most researchers in the field of climate 
science accepted that the most likely primary cause of the observed increase of global mean 
surface temperature was due to a long term increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and 
thus the likelihood of most tropical ocean basins  warm significantly due to the same cause; 
and (3)  sea surface temperatures will increase by an even greater amount in the 21st century 
than during the 20th century as described by the IPCC (2001).35  
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The IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report has validated these earlier findings and thus confirms that 
there is very high confidence that the impacts of climate-related extremes, including tropical 
cyclones, reveal significant vulnerability and expose some ecosystems and many human 
systems to current climate variability.36  Records also show that Ian is among the eight most 
severe tropical cyclones to hit Tonga between 1960 and 2014.37  The five most destructive 
tropical cyclones recorded to have affected the South Pacific happened in the last two 
decades  including  cyclone Zoe in 2002 (890 hPa), Pam 2014 (896 hPa), Percy 2004 (900 
hPa), Ron (900 hPa), and Susan (900 hPa).38   
 
This combined evidence may be sufficient to establish a causal link between climate change 
and tropical cyclones as an extreme climate event influenced by the changing climate which 
adversely affect human systems directly and indirectly. 
    
The Law of State Responsibility 
 
To establish State responsibility, a State must commit an internationally wrongful act as 
against another State39 which consists of an act or omission.40   The conduct to qualify as an 
internationally wrongful act must first be attributable to the State, and secondly that act 
attributable to the State constitutes a breach of an international obligation existing of that 
State.41  It is important to realise that the legal responsibility that arises is not limited to 
bilateral relations but can extend to other States, who are members of the international 
community and have ‘legal interests in the protection of certain basic rights and the fulfilment 
of certain essential obligations’.42  This view of the International Law Commission (ILC) 
links to the international law norm of avoiding harm to others even outside one’s State 
borders.43                                          
                                                                                                                                               
The United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) is the starting 
point in an attempt to establish State responsibility.  The UNFCCC is binding upon State 
Parties and they have special legal obligations under it.  These obligations could be viewed as 
individual and joint obligations44 that aim to achieve the ultimate purpose of the UNFCCC.   
However, any liability arising under the UNFCCC can only arise against another State.     
In the case of Ha’apai, Tonga could make a claim on behalf of the affected communities 
under the UNFCCC and against all industrialised countries labelled as Annex 1 parties with 
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36 IPCC, Climate Change 2014:  Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability – Summary for Policymaker, (2014), 6. 
Risks to human systems and ecosystems include infrastructure damage, supply chain, ecosystems, and social 
system disruption; public health impacts; and water quality impairment, due to sea level rise, extreme 
precipitation, and cyclones. 
37 Tonga Meteorological Service, List of Tropical Cyclones that has affected at least a part of Tonga from 1960 
to present, http://www.met.gov.to/index_files/tc_history.pdf (accessed 21 November). 
38 International Pacific Research Center, Asia-Pacific Data-Research Center Archives, (2008) 
http://apdrc.soest.hawaii.edu/projects/speartc/download_speartc.php?email=fitilagi.faanunu@gmail.com 
(accessed 21 November). 
39 See International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries (2001), Art 2. 
40 ILC, (2001), above n 39.  
41 Ibid, at [5] and [7], above n 39.  Also see Factory at Chorzow’s case, (Germany v Poland), (Judgment of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice) (1927) 9. 
42 ILC, (2001), above n 39, art 1. 
43 See Smelter Trail Case (United States, Canada), (Decision of the Trail Smelter Arbitration) (1935) 62. 
44 Individual obligations in accordance with principles articulated in Article 3 and commitments in Article 4. 
Joint obligation can be referred to the collective obligations to achieve the objective in Article 2 as the result of 
their individual efforts or otherwise the combined effect of their individual efforts.!
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damages to be apportioned amongst them.   The following discussion however suggests that 
as a people Ha’apai communities could also make a claim by themselves through Human 
Rights mechanisms and procedures. 
 
Causation 
 
The distinction between general and specific causation in this context is necessary.  General 
causation requires the activity in question to be causally linked to the general outcome of a 
resulting damage45 such in the case of anthropogenic activities as the dominant cause of 
climate change.46  Specific causation concerns the causal link between a specific type of 
activity such as a particular State’s emissions, with a specific type of result such as tropical 
cyclones.47   I focus my argument on specific causation to establish a possible claim for the 
Ha’apai communities resulting from the damage done by tropical cyclone Ian.    
 
I argue that the IPCC findings point out that tropical cyclones are influenced by climate 
change.  Despite claims that damage ‘due to multiple sources and where no single emitter can 
be identified’ is difficult to establish unless there is ‘convincing evidence’.48 I persist in 
arguing that the Tonga records appear to be consistent with the IPCC findings in regards the 
intensity and not the regularity of cyclones.  They present sufficient and convincing evidence 
to establish that the damage suffered from tropical cyclone Ian were at least partially 
attributable to climate change.49  In the Trail Smelter case, it was sufficient that the damage 
caused was ‘at least partially caused by the polluting activity of the smelter in Trail hence 
Canada was sufficient.50  Such a finding is relevant to this argument that developed countries’ 
historical contributions causing climate change have attributed to tropical cyclones in regards 
their intensity and the damage caused is attributed to that causal link.  The amount and who 
contributed what, is only relevant to the apportionment of costs.51 
 
The counter argument is that Tonga has experienced tropical cyclones in the past with similar 
intensity and perhaps severe damage like cyclones Isaac and Ron.52    Cyclone Ian is a unique 
case as it emerged in a time when there is strong evidence that strongly supports climate 
change as affecting weather and climate events including tropical cyclones.   
 
Violation of International Obligations 
 
International legal norms require all signatories to not frustrate the purpose of the 
UNFCCC.53  Likewise, the non-parties are also open to liability should they frustrate the 
UNFCCC’s objectives.54  Article 2 holds all parties accountable and liability arises where the 
Annex 1 countries have failed to act consistently with the object of the UNFCCC. For 
instance, where the Annex 1 countries have failed to implement domestic policies and 
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45 Voigt, (2008), above n 16, 15. 
46 IPCC, (2013), above n 17.  Also see Richard S.J. Tol and Roda Verheyen, State responsibility and 
compensation for climate change damages – a legal and economic assessment, (2004). 
47 Voigt, (2008), above n 16, 16. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See Smelter Trail Case (United States, Canada), (1935), above n 43, 62.   
50 Voigt, (2008), above n 16, 16. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Tonga Meteorological Service, above n 37. 
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, (entered into force 27 January 
1980) art 18. 
54 Ibid.   
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measures to  deal with climate change that are cost effective to ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible cost as required by Article 3.55  Any failure to do so is a failure of parties to 
fulfil their obligations to achieve the object of the UNFCCC.  In turn, such failures give rise 
to further breaches of the States obligations under Article 3 to take precautionary measures to 
prevent and minimize causes of climate change which means a failure to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 
 
Article 4 spells out certain commitments for the Annex 1 countries.  Such language denotes 
clear obligations for the Annex 1 countries and any failure to act accordingly will give rise to 
liability. 
 
Standard of Proof  
 
Perhaps the most critical issue for establishing climate change liability against the Annex 1 
countries is the standard of proof which the claiming State(s) must meet.  The standard of 
proof must be appropriate and that it allows to remedy any uncertainties and with the view 
that it must be consistent with the principles as interpreted in the context of the Convention to 
achieve its purpose.  It is submitted that the standard of proof should be “on the balance of 
probabilities” as in any civil lawsuit.  There is merit for this view.  The principle of 
precautionary as interpreted in the context of the UNFCCC encompasses an element of 
foreseeability.  The failure of Annex 1 countries to take the necessary precautionary measures 
or actions that ‘anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its 
adverse effects’, and harm which results from that failure, will lead to a logical conclusion 
that harm was foreseeable.  This is also relevant to achieve the purpose of the Convention and 
that actions taken by Annex 1 countries need to be assessed on the basis of probability 
whether they are more likely to cause harm than not, and whether that would frustrate the 
objective of the Convention. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
International Climate Change Framework 
 
The UNFCCC 
 
The UNFCCC acknowledges that climate change and its adverse effects is a common 
concern of humankind and is attributed to human activities.  It resulted from Rio in 1992 
where it was first acknowledged that there was human-induced climate change but there was 
scientific uncertainty to substantiate the claims.  States at Rio proceeded to adopt the 
UNFCCC on the premise that there was a need to address climate change even in the face of 
scientific uncertainty based on the precautionary principle.56  The IPCC Assessment Report 4 
published in 2007 (AR4, 2007) confirmed that there was man-made climate change and was 
reaffirmed by the IPCC AR5, 2013.57    The UNFCCC also acknowledges climate change as a 
common concern for all humankind58 and highlights further that the increasing atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases by human activities will enhance the greenhouse effect 
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55 United Nations Framework on Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC), opened for signature from 4 to 14 
June 1992, (entered into force 21 March 1994) art 3. 
56 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Handbook (2006), 15. 
57 IPCC, (2013), above n 17. 
58 UNFCCC, above n 55, Preamble.  
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which may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.59   Article 2, states its object 
and calls for an international response to ‘stabilize greenhouse gas emissions in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’.60 It further reiterates the views already propounded by the General 
Assembly and other relevant bodies to ‘protect the global climate for present and future 
generations of mankind’.  This is reinforced by the guiding principles for implementation of 
the Convention in Article 3.61   
 
The UNFCCC does not make explicit references to human rights but it is argued that human 
rights references are implicit, firstly in the preamble highlighting the intention of the Parties 
in bringing the Convention to life, and secondly in the guiding principles under Article 3.62  
The obligations to achieve its ultimate objective appear to be owed by State Parties to ensure 
to each other rather than individuals and people outside their jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, it 
can be argued that the obligation is also owed to individuals and people who make up the 
State.  The essential feature of the UNFCCC is the special obligations on Annex I countries 
to lead in the implementation of the UNFCCC.63 
 
These references mirror the concerns of State Parties that climate change affects humans and 
thus their basic human rights as discussed here.  It is submitted that State Parties have an 
obligation to regulate actors within their jurisdiction to protect the rights of people 
everywhere from any violation now and in the future, and such an interpretation is consistent 
with the object and principles of the UNFCCC.64  It is also submitted that an obligation arises 
on the basis that these rights are accepted as general principles of international law which 
binds all States to observe.65 And irrespective of the source of the obligation, a violation of 
these rights gives rise to a separate right to a remedy.  This also means that this obligation 
extends to those who are not parties under the Convention as the right to food and water, 
health, life and an adequate standard of living as well as the right to self-determination which, 
as already submitted, is an universal and inherent right, essential to the ideal of free human 
rights as embraced by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR).66  One needs not 
read too much into these references to recognise that human rights are addressed throughout 
the UNFCCC.  Hereby the IPCC reports presenting the best scientific evidence form a strong 
evidential basis for the argument that the industrialised countries with the greatest emissions 
contributing to this changing climate have an obligation to individuals and peoples whose 
basic human rights have been violated as the result of industrialised countries’ wrongful acts.  
It should also be noted that the UNFCCC addresses climate change as a means to raise 
standards of living of all peoples of the world, and explicitly mentions the right to sustainable 
development.  This means that there is overlap between the objective of the UNFCCC and the 
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59 Ibid. 
60 UNFCCC, above n 55, art 2. 
61 Guiding principles include the precautionary principle, sustainable development, common but differentiated 
responsibility, and respective capabilities, and equity.   
62 Article 3, paragraph 1 may be interpreted as clearly referring to the rights of the next generation and this 
provision is in conformity with the Rights of Children to life and to develop (Article 6), adequate living 
standards (Article 27) and under Article 23 for proper conditions for mentally and physically disabled children 
could be compromised by the threats of climate change and its adverse effects as predicted.  Also see 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), (entered into force 02 September 1990). 
63 UNFCCC, above n 55, art 3 at [1]. 
64 Ibid, art 2 and art 3, at [1].   
65 Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38 at [1]. 
66 ILC, (2001), above n 39, art 1.   
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aims of the United Nations as laid down in the UN Charter.67  States have repeatedly uttered 
this mission through various international frameworks including the human rights68 and 
climate change laws discussed here, and we must not lose sight of this mission for the good 
of the international community. 
 
The Kyoto Protocol 
 
The Kyoto Protocol can be viewed as the strategic implementation plan of the Convention to 
achieve the Convention’s purpose more effectively by creating legally binding emission 
reduction targets. The ultimate goal is to safeguard the climate system from any dangerous 
interference by human activities that could mean even worse disasters than what we are 
experiencing and have been experiencing thus far.  The Protocol focuses on the Parties who 
have committed themselves to be legally bound to reduce emissions to an average of 5 
percent against 1990 levels within the first commitment period commencing in 2008 and 
ending in 2012.69  Further implementation plans include the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), International Emissions Trading and the Joint Implementation Mechanism as a 
means to allow flexibility to Parties to achieve their targets in a cost effective way.  This is in 
fact consistent with Article 2, paragraph 1(b) which encourages Parties to work through both 
individual and combined efforts to be more effective by means of exchange of information 
and experiences on policies and measures.   
 
The Kyoto Protocol aims to fulfil the object of the Convention and therefore it is submitted 
that it addresses human rights issues as well as those that are implicitly referenced throughout 
the Convention. Climate Change as a global crisis affecting humanity and thus people’s basic 
and fundamental human rights.  The same obligation arising under the Convention owing to 
those within the jurisdiction and those outside of the jurisdiction, it is submitted, also arises 
under the Kyoto Protocol.70   
 
Human Rights Protection under Environmental Protection Frameworks 
 
The Rio Declaration was adopted to recognise the importance of the environment and 
development. Although the declaration itself is not legally binding, its principles are 
reinforced in the UNFCCC as another resulting document of the Rio Summit.   The 
Declaration was built upon the principles of the Stockholm Declaration of 1972,71  which 
espouses basic human rights to life, equality and adequate conditions of life supported by an 
environment that allows for a life of dignity and wellbeing, and the protection of the 
environment for the present and future generations.72  These principles are restated in the Rio 
Declaration.73 In fact, at the time the two instruments were adopted, these principles were 
‘either understood to already reflect customary international law or expected to shape future 
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67 Charter of the United Nations (1945) Preamble. 
68 Human Rights Council, GA Res 60/251. 
69 Kyoto Protocol (1998). 
70 ILC, (2001), above n 39, art 1. 
71 The Stockholm Declaration consists of a preamble featuring seven introductory proclamations and 26 
principles centred on the human environment.  Thus the environmental policy goals and objectives are quite 
broad which resulted in the adoption of the Rio Declaration to recognise the emerging issues to ‘synthesise 
economic and development considerations in environmental decision-making’ to name a few. 
72 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), (16 June 
1972), Principle 1 http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503 
(accessed 20 November 2015). 
73 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (14 June 1992), Principle 1 and 3. 
!
!
A#50!
normative expectations’.74   The same principles are restated in the UNFCCC75 and are 
critical to the implementation of the Convention to achieve its objective.  It is thus suggested 
that on the basis of these principles they lend support to the interpretation of human rights 
obligations arising under the UNFCCC, hence State responsibility in the context of climate 
change as addressed by the UNFCCC.76  
 
The Declaration recognises the special needs of developing countries and their 
environmentally vulnerable situations and calls for international efforts to address their 
interests and needs.77  These are also highlighted in the UNFCCC expressly78 and 
implicitly.79  However, in light of the IPCC findings, current practices appear inadequate and 
are too slow to repair the damage already done and are inconsistent with obligations to 
‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the climate system’.80 States should thus 
be mindful of important general principles of international law and also customary 
international law to avoid harm done to others even outside their own jurisdiction and which 
all States must respect and abide by and thus no derogation is permitted.81  With that in mind, 
the achievement of a legally binding agreement in Paris in December 2015 is thus critical and 
should reflect the countries’ real commitments in the absence of political interests to achieve 
the object of the UNFCCC which the survival of many vulnerable communities like Ha’apai, 
Tonga depend on. 
 
Human Rights Frameworks 
 
For the purpose of this article, the international human rights frameworks discussed here are 
limited to the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR) with the exceptions of the Optional 
Protocols.82    
 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
 
Following the horrific experiences of the Second World War, States got together to formulate 
the UDHR and laid down the general human rights standards and freedoms and provided a 
guide for subsequent human rights frameworks which developed human rights to a level as 
we see it today.  The UDHR is conceived as: 
 
…a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations…[and the] 
most important and far-reaching of all United Nations declarations…a 
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74 Audiovisual Library of International Law, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment Stockholm (16 June 1972), Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, (14 June 1992), 
(2013) http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/dunche/dunche.html (accessed 21 November 2015). 
75 UNFCCC, above n 55, art 3. 
76 Margaretha Wewerinke and Curtis F.J. Doebbler, ‘Exploring the Legal Basis of a Human Rights Approach to 
Climate Change’ (2011) 10(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 141, 144. 
77 Rio Declaration, above n 73. 
78 UNFCCC, above n 55, art 3 at [2], art 4 at [8].  
79 Ibid art 3 at [1], on the basis of common but differentiated responsibilities. 
80 Ibid art 2.  
81 See VCLT, opened for signature 23 May 1969, above n 53, art 53.  
82 See United Nations, Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights (1996) 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf (accessed 18 November 2015). 
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fundamental source of inspiration for national and international efforts to 
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.83   
 
The core principles of human rights espoused in the UDHR are recognised as universal, 
interdependent and indivisible. The same principles were also adopted in the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action on Human Rights on 25 June 1993 and reaffirmed 
those principles.84 Human rights entail both rights and obligations from duty bearers and right 
holders.  Article 29(3) of the UDHR specifically stipulates that rights and freedoms may in no 
case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.85   
 
The preamble is not binding but the intention of States is seen through various articles that 
stipulate human rights obligations and thus binding on all States.  Moreover, the general 
principles and standards established by the UDHR are recognised and accepted as general 
principles of international law and form part of customary international law and thus binds all 
States.  By assuming responsibility under the UDHR, States must respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights requirements accordingly.86  To respect means that ‘they must refrain from 
interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights’.87  To protect requires that 
‘States protect individual rights and groups against human rights abuses’.88  The obligation to 
fulfil means that ‘States must take positive actions to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human 
rights’.89   
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
 
The ICESCR was adopted to provide measures for the implementation of economic, social 
and cultural human rights as specific rights addressed by this instrument.  As part of the 
IBHR, it mirrors similar rights90 enshrined in the UDHR with the addition of the right to self-
determination.91  The right to self-determination is recognised as universal, based on the 
principles of the UDHR that the ideal free human being means possessing the right to enjoy 
the freedom to determine his economic, social and cultural rights amongst other human 
rights.92 Thus on that basis, Article 1 enunciates expressly that all people can ‘freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development’93 and ‘in no case may a people be deprived 
of its own means of subsistence’.94  
 
The State Parties have a primary responsibility to protect, respect and to guarantee these 
rights to individuals and people alike within their own territorial boundaries.  Paragraph 3 is 
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83 The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 
1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) with its two Optional Protocols and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). 
84 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (25 June 1993). 
85 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAORArt 29(3). 
86 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The Foundation of International Human Rights Law 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml (accessed 21 November 2015).  
87 Ibid.   
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. 
90 UDHR, above n 85, art 22-27, which introduces the rights to which everyone is entitled “as a member of 
society”.  Also see UN, Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), above n 82. 
91 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
1966, GA Res 2200A (XXI), (entered into force 3 January 1976), art 1. 
92 Ibid art 1.  
93 ICESCR, above n 91, art 1 at [1].  
94 Ibid art 1 at [2].  
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suggested to impose an obligation on State Parties to promote this right beyond their 
territorial boundaries95 ‘in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations’.96 Article 11 makes specific reference to everyone being entitled to ‘an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food…, and to the 
continuous improvement of living conditions’.97  It also recognises the right of everyone to 
enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health98 and calls for States to 
fully realise this right99 by means of improving all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene100 amongst other things.  Moreover, it provides that everyone has the right to take 
part in a cultural life.101   
 
These specific rights are limited to the measures and restrictions set out in the ICESCR.  At 
the same time, the right to self-determination is a universal and inherent right which finds its 
origin in the UN Charter and is thus protected beyond the scope of this Covenant as it is 
considered a general principle of international law binding on all States.  This is apparent 
from its Article 25: 
 
Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of 
all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.102 
 
It should be emphasised that in accordance with the law of State responsibility, States must 
provide an adequate and effective remedy to victims of a violation of these rights. 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
 
The ICCPR consists of similar rights including the right to self-determination.103  Like the 
ICESCR, it was built upon the general principles of UDHR and conforms to the ultimate 
mission articulated by States through the UN Charter.104 It restates that these rights ‘derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person’.105   The ICCPR articulates specific measures 
and limits for implementing civil and political rights.   State Parties are to respect, protect and 
fulfil their human rights obligations in respect of the civil and political rights of their own 
people within their territorial boundaries.106   The ICCPR also imposes obligations on States 
Parties to conform to the spirit and intention of States as enshrined in the preambles of the 
Covenants and the UDHR in regards to respecting the rights of individuals and people outside 
their own jurisdictions.107  It calls for States to realise these rights without discrimination of 
any kind108  and to ensure that any violation of individual rights and freedoms committed 
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95 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Comment No.12:  Article 1 (Right to Self-
determination), (1984). 
96 UN Charter, above n 67, art 55, 56, 59.  
97 ICESCR, above n 91, art 11 at [1].  
98 Ibid art 12 at [1].   
99 Ibid art 12 at [2].  
100 Ibid art 12 at [2][b].  
101 Ibid art 15 at [1][a].  
102 Ibid art 25.  
103 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, (entered into 
force 23 March 1976) art 1. 
104 UN Charter, above n 67, Preamble. 
105 ICPPR, above n 103, Preamble.  
106 UN Charter, above n 67.  Also see UDHR, above n 85. 
107 ICCPR, General Comment (1984), above n 95.  
108 ICCPR, above n 103, art 2.  
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even ‘by persons acting in an official capacity shall have an effective remedy…’109 Article 5 
prevents any State Party from performing any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms recognised by the ICCPR110 and it recognises fundamental human rights 
existing in State Parties to the ICCPR by virtue of their domestic laws, despite the absence of 
those rights from the Covenant.111   
 
Notably the obligations arising under this Covenant give rise to State responsibility as 
signatories to the Covenant.  Likewise, the non-Parties have a responsibility to observe these 
rights by virtue of these rights being fundamental human rights deriving from the inherent 
dignity of the human person – a general principle of international law.112 
   
EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE CAUSING INTERFERENCE 
WITH A RANGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE HA’APAI PEOPLE  
 
Right to Life (inclusive of liberty and security of person) 
 
While the right to life is articulated in Article 3 of the UDHR, it does not however expound 
what the right entails.113  One may understand it as the right to live or exist in one’s own 
place or more generally a right to live as an inhabitant of the Earth.  One may also add that no 
one has the right to end another person’s life or to take his or her own life.  In fact, these 
views are apparent in Article 6 of the ICCPR.114  
 
Every human being has the inherent right to life.  This right shall be protected by 
law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
 
At the village community level as in the case of Ha’apai, the right to life can mean many 
things including the right of access to health care; access to adequate food and water to live 
sustainably and enjoy a better standard of living.  In fact the Government of Tonga has for 
some years recognised as its mission to achieve a better standard of living for the people of 
Tonga.115    Clearly, the right to life overlaps with other human rights but it is a right that is 
inherent and inalienable which every human is entitled to, irrespective of age, race, 
nationality, colour, religion or level of education.116   
 
The enjoyment of this right also depends on one’s source(s) of food supplies on a sustainable 
basis.  In the context of Ha’apai being comprised of small communities, the natural 
environment is the source of their livelihood.  When they are destroyed or interfered with to 
the extent that people cannot have adequate food to eat or water to drink, it is thus to be said 
that people cannot fully enjoy their right to life, and a violation of this right by acts or 
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109 Ibid art 2 at [3][b].  
110 Ibid art 5 at [1].  
111 UDHR, above n 85, art 5.  
112 ILC, (2001), above n 39, art 1 at [4][4] and [5].  
113 UDHR, above n 85.  
114 ICCPR, above n 103. 
115 Tonga Strategic Development Framework (TSDF), (2011-2014), 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-ton-2014-2016-oth-02.pdf (accessed 11 
November 2015); Strategic Development Plan Eight, (2006-2009), 
https://www.sprep.org/att/IRC/eCOPIES/Countries/Tonga/13.pdf (accessed 11 November 2015). 
116 ICCPR, above n 103.  Also see UDHR, above n 85. 
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omissions by one or more States warrants fair compensation under international laws and in 
accordance with universally accepted rules and principles.   
 
Right to an Adequate Standard of Living  
 
The right to an adequate standard of living is stipulated both in the UDHR (Article 25) and 
the ICESCR (Article 11).  The UDHR identifies this right as universal and reaffirmed by the 
ICESCR which further calls on State Parties to take appropriate actions to ensure the 
realization of this right.117   The right entails that human beings’ health and wellbeing achieve 
a certain standard or condition that is categorized as “adequate” in regards to access to food, 
clothing, housing, medical care, necessary social services, right to security in employment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age and other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond one’s control.118  Again this right overlaps with other human rights such as the right 
to food and water.  It seeks to achieve a level of adequacy to which every human being is 
entitled in order to fully enjoy this right. 
   
Right to Food  
 
A natural environment that is destroyed by the impacts of climate change means the 
destruction of peoples’ livelihoods.  The scarcity of food or water as the natural consequence 
of climate change is inevitable.  Article 11, paragraph 2 of the ICESCR makes clear provision 
for States to recognise this fundamental right and to take internationally cooperative measures 
to improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food through the full use 
of technical and scientific knowledge.119  In addition, that food importing and exporting 
countries ensure an equitable distribution of food supplies according to need.120  
 
To translate this into the context of Ha’apai requires an understanding of Ha’apai’s 
vulnerability to natural disasters and the physical environment in which the communities live.  
Food production is hampered by many factors with climate change as the biggest threat to 
food security.  This also includes the effects of climate change on coral bleaching and sea 
level rise that equally impact on food production and the capacity of the environment to 
respond to the changing climate and are critical concerns for the Ha’apai group of low lying 
islands. 
 
Right to Health  
 
The right to health includes both the physical and mental health which every human being 
should fully enjoy to the highest attainable standard.121  Article 12 of the ICESCR provides 
that Sates should take steps to achieve the full realization of this right and further identifies 
other matters for States to address.122  Again the right to health is an indivisible component of 
the right to food or the right to be free from hunger and the right to liberty in its broadest 
sense. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 ICESCR, above n 91.  
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid.  
120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid art 12.  
122 Ibid. States are encouraged to (1) reducing the rate of stillbirth, infant mortality and the healthy development 
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Right to Self-Determination  
 
The right to self-determination finds prominence in Articles 1 of the ICESCR and the ICCPR 
respectively, and it marks the importance of realising it as a fundamental human right.123  
Recognising this right in two international human rights frameworks were major milestones 
and developments since the United Nations General Assembly’s (UNGA) Resolution 1514 
(XV) of December 1960.124  In accordance with Article 1 of the ICESCR, the right entails 
that ‘all people’ can determine their own political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.125  It also includes the right for all people to freely dispose 
of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit and 
international law.  More importantly, paragraph 2 stresses that ‘[i]n no case may people be 
deprived of their own means of subsistence’ and this is relevant to small island nations and its 
vulnerable communities like Ha’apai. 
 
The typical lifestyle on small island communities is that their survival depends on what they 
can grow on limited land areas and acquire from the ocean.  This lifestyle is what defines 
who they are and thus their perceptions of human rights may thus differ slightly. For 
example, the older generation may view the right to life and self-determination to mean the 
right to live on their small islands until they die.  The community that they have known and 
grown up in is part of them and that right should not be interfered with against potential 
migration.  It may be interpreted as the right to an identity or culture which in accordance 
with the right of self-determination, require States to respect and to guarantee this right to the 
Ha’apai people. 
 
The low lying coral atolls with the smallest of islands having a landmass stretching to only 
about less than 1 hectare (less than 10000 square meters or below 3 acres),126  are already 
exposed to the rising sea level.  Storm surges during tropical cyclones pose much threat to the 
islands’ landmasses as well as the people.  The Ha’apai communities, as a people, dubbed in 
Tonga as wise people, which in Tongan is termed fakapotopoto, have the right to pursue and 
develop culturally.  Their own traditional or cultural norms are well preserved and understood 
not only amongst Tongans locally but also abroad which should be safeguarded against any 
violation resulting from climate change and its consequences.  
 
Other evidence of human rights violations are presented by the Mo’unga’one island situation.  
Mo’unga’one is another small community and one of the small islands that was severely 
affected by cyclone Ian.  The residents are comprised of mainly the elderly and young 
children.  Shops are absent on the island and people are dependent on fishing and agriculture 
for their survival.  Travelling to Mo’unga’one takes about an hour and a half by small boats 
from the island of Lifuka which also depends on the tide.  The experiences of cyclone Ian 
raised more awareness amongst the people of Mo’unga’one of the need to build their capacity 
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to respond and cope in times of disasters by improving communication systems.127   Work 
has commenced but one must not concede that building the resilience of communities is 
sufficient because while they are resilient they must do so in order to survive and live a 
normal life.  But more should be done at the international level to avoid further violation to 
human rights of these small communities as well as the rights of future generations whose 
rights are to be guaranteed to them at the present time and must be protected.  
 
Thus in agreement with Margaretha Wewerinke, self-determination is thus relevant to climate 
change in so far as  the adverse effects of climate change interfere with the full enjoyment of 
the right and may also deny the people of Ha’apai their right to a culture of their own and 
their economic development.128  It is to be said as well that the exercise of this right should 
not be limited to a narrow definition by human rights committees as a right applicable to 
indigenous communities with discrete and separate languages and customs.  While this 
proposal may give rise to complex outcomes, it is submitted, that the wellbeing and 
sustainability of Ha’apai communities are dependent on the global community and the 
collective efforts to safeguard means of subsistence living which is the paramount 
consideration. 
 
INTERFERENCE WITH SELECTED HUMAN RIGHTS BY STATE CONDUCT 
 
As a result of the heavier responsibility imposed on the Annex I countries to take the lead in 
reducing emissions, there is clear evidence that these State Parties have not done  enough to 
curb emissions and prevent  adverse effects affecting vulnerable people such as the Ha’apai 
communities.  Annex I countries are seemingly not complying with their obligations under 
the UNFCCC particularly under Articles 2, 4 and 7 and are also failing to take effective 
compliance measures in accordance with the precautionary principle to safeguard rights now 
and  in the future. It should be recalled that Article 2 suggests an obligation to take measures 
to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system; and that Article 
4(2)(a) requires the adoption of ‘national policies and corresponding measures…’ that will 
achieve the objective of the Convention.129  This is clear from the IPCC Report 2013 which 
highlights that there has been a consistent warming in the last three decades and between 
1983-2012 was ‘likely the warmest 30 year-period of the last 1400 years (medium 
confidence)’.130  This suggests that there is a need for deep cuts in emissions to keep the 
global warming below the 1.5 degree Celsius called for by the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS) as the acceptable global temperature limit for the survival of SIDS and which SIDS 
hope to achieve in Paris in December 2015.  Industrialised nations must be mindful that 
mitigation and adaptation mechanisms under the UNFCCC are inadequate.   
 
The effects of climate change that are  reaching the stage of SIDS exceeding their capacity to 
adapt warrants greater consideration  for a human rights-based approach as the needed and 
immediate action to address climate change and its impacts.  A human rights-based approach 
should thus be considered in discussions and negotiations in Paris in December this year 
which so far has not been reflected in the Paris Draft Agreement.  However, there is no 
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agreement on human rights in the draft agreement and this is evident from its inclusion in 
only Option 1 of Article 2 but absent in Option 2.  Once again, the effects of climate change 
violate human rights and those rights are intrinsic to being human whose wellbeing is 
threatened by climate change and its adverse effects.  Vulnerable communities, like the 
Ha’apai people whose livelihoods have been destroyed, damaged and threatened to sustain 
them, should be recognised and be considered for reparation under international law.  
 
ANALYSIS OF HA’APAI’S CLAIM FOR REPARATIONS FOR DAMAGES AND 
INJURIES 
 
The provisions of international climate change law (ICCL) explored in this article identify 
that there are States obligations in respect to human rights which are explicitly or implicitly 
referenced in the UNFCCC.   It has been argued that it is impossible to exclude human rights 
issues within the context of climate change that affect human systems.  A breach of an 
obligation to observe general principles of international and customary international law is of 
paramount importance which can give rise to a remedy.131  That is, where an instrument is 
silent on recourse for a breach of an obligation, customary international law as well as 
general principles of international law can assist in clarifying these legal issues.132  
 
A claim for climate change damages and injuries for Ha’apai resulting from cyclone Ian 
would need to meet the legal requirements to establish liability against developed States: (1) 
there is an existing legal obligation of those States; (2) a breach of those legal obligations is 
established; and (3) an internationally wrongful act including an omission is attributable to 
those States at the time the act was committed.133  International law on State responsibility 
sets the rules for finding States responsible for violations of international law,134 and this is 
equally true for establishing a violation of human rights under international law. As 
Wewerinke and Doebbler state: 
 
[T]he law on State responsibility for international human rights obligations 
serves to ensure that there is always an actor responsible for upholding human 
rights standards.135  
 
This article has also attempted to demonstrate that International Human Rights Law (IHRL) 
provides parallel obligations which could provide an additional basis for reparation claims.136  
Apart from obligations of States arising under human rights treaties, human rights 
mechanisms including human rights bodies and procedures exist which can be employed 
through which claims for violations of human rights may be lodged.137  Their capacity as 
quasi-judicial bodies can enforce IHRL for the benefits of rights holders.  This is true for a 
claim for the Ha’apai people which Tonga as a State can lodge on their behalf against the 
responsible State or States under treaty-based bodies.  However, the claim may be confronted 
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with some difficulties but a course that could test these mechanisms in enforcing human 
rights obligations that exist. 
 
Tonga however, is not a party to either ICESCR138 or ICCPR139 which have treaty-based 
committees established under them respectively.  The argument that Ha’apai people may on 
their own submit a claim as ‘a people’ against one State or States under these Covenants as 
the subjects of the right to self-determination is based on the wide understanding that the 
principle of self-determination is not limited to ‘colonized peoples’.140  It is also submitted 
that Ha’apai people develop on their own within their limited means and thus rely primarily 
on subsistence agriculture and fisheries to sustain them.  These, it is argued, are important 
issues to take into account when considering whether the right of self-determination is 
applicable and a basis for lodging a human rights claim and are crucial in the protection of 
fundamental human rights from any violation by climate change effects. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
This article has shown that there is a legal basis for a human rights claim for climate change 
damages and injuries under international law for Ha’apai communities. Obligations to protect 
human beings against the adverse effects of climate change arise under both the climate 
change and human rights frameworks. Developed countries who are largely responsible for 
anthropogenic climate change have legal obligations under those international laws to avoid 
damaging climate change impacts and related human rights violations. The international 
responsibility of developed States for violations of those obligations could be established 
based on the clear and convincing evidence presented by the IPCC and Tonga. Indeed, this 
lends support to the argument that extreme weather events including tropical cyclones like 
Ian are attributable to man-made climate change. A preferable channel for obtaining 
reparations is the UNFCCC, where Tonga could seek to reach an agreement with other State 
Parties on the provision of reparations. An international agreement on Loss and Damage 
could be one way of securing reparations for violations of international law that affect 
communities such as the Ha’apai communities. However, it is unclear whether Loss and 
Damage arrangements under the UNFCCC would be sufficiently ambitious to provide 
remedies that are ‘adequate and effective’ as required under human rights law. It is therefore 
important that invoking State responsibility remains an option for local communities affected 
by climate change as well as for States that represent those communities on the international 
plane. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
138 ICESCR, above n 91, Part IV.  
139 ICCPR, above n 103, art 41.  
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HEALTH AND OUR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY TO DEAL 
WITH CLIMATE CHANGE: A WHO PERSPECTIVE 
 
FLAVIA BUSTREO * 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This comment addresses the relationship between health and climate change, a nexus that occurs 
against a backdrop of existing human rights standards. These standards beg for a comprehensive 
right to health approach to climate change, grounded in strong accountability mechanisms, universal 
application and a clear awareness of the impact of climate change on the realisation of the right to 
health. First, the contours of this relationship are briefly explained. Second, some forums for action 
are described. And third, and perhaps most importantly, an agenda for action is suggested. 
 
The comment is written from the perspective of the World Health Organization (WHO). Working 
on health across the life course at WHO, we have seen how climate change illustrates more 
dramatically than any other global development issue, the crushing effect of inequalities in health. 
The adverse effects of climate change are felt most acutely by vulnerable segments of the 
population whose geography, poverty, gender, age, indigenous or minority status put them at 
special risk. Conversely, States facing higher exposure to extreme weather events, in both rural and 
urban areas are those most likely to be lacking the resources for implementing plans and 
programmes of action to meet this challenge. This comment suggests that the only way to change 
this reality is to acknowledge the critical role of human rights in examining and developing policy 
to address this modern phenomenon. 
 
HEALTH AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The fact that climate change affects human health has been well documented1 and space is too short 
to recount the voluminous data that exist in this comment. Some comments about what we – as a 
global community - know, however, are important. We know, for instance, that the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has warned for some time that “[b]etween 2030 and 2050, climate change is 
expected to cause approximately 250,000 additional deaths per year, from malnutrition, malaria, 
diarrhoea and heat stress.”2 More recent studies further warn us that these consequences might be 
even more diverse, severe, and imminent, than earlier expected.3 We also know that the adverse 
effects of climate change are universal – and will have a profound impact on the health of almost all 
people on the planet.4 And we know that some regions of the world will suffer greater health 
                                                
* Dr. Flavia Bustreo is the Assistant Director-General of the World Health Organization responsible for the cluster on 
Family, Women’s and Children’s Health that includes the organizations work on climate change. 
1. See for example, World Health Organization, ‘Protecting Health From Climate Change: Connecting Science, Policy 
and People’, Geneva: World Health Organization, 2009; WHO, ‘Factsheet on Climate Change and Health’ accessible at 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs266/en/ (accessed on 1 September 2015).  
2. WHO. Quantitative risk assessment of the effects of climate change on selected causes of death, 2030s and 2050s. 
(2014), World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. 
3. Hansen, J., Sato, M., Hearty, P., Ruedy, R., Kelley, M., Masson-Delmotte, V., Russell, G., Tselioudis, G., Cao, J., 
Rignot, E., Velicogna, I., Kandiano, E., Schuckmann, K. von, Kharecha P., Legrande, A.N., Bauer, M., and Lo, K.W., 
“Ice melt, sea level rise and superstorms: evidence from paleoclimate data, climate modeling, and modern observations 
that 2 ◦C global warming is highly dangerous,” 15 Atmos. Chem. Phys. Discuss. 20059–20179 (2015). 
4. See generally, Smith, K.R., A.Woodward, D. Campbell-Lendrum, D.D. Chadee, Y. Honda, Q. Liu, J.M. Olwoch, B. 
Revich, and R. Sauerborn, “Chapter 11: Human health: impacts, adaptation, and co-benefits in Field,” contribution of 
Working Group II to C.B., Barros, V.R., Dokken, D.J., Mach, K.J., Mastrandrea, M.D., Bilir, T.E., Chatterjee, M., Ebi, 
K.L., Estrada, Y.O., Genova, R.C., Girma, B., Kissel, E.S., Levy, A.N., MacCracken, S., Mastrandrea, P.R., and White, 
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consequences than others.5  
 
Climate change: worsening health inequities 
 
Extreme weather events, such as the European heatwave of 2003 and Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy 
in the USA, show that, even in the most developed countries, health is vulnerable to climate risks. 
The risks are even greater, however, for the poorest populations, who already suffer from high 
burdens of climate-sensitive disease. For example, the mortality rate from vector-borne diseases is 
almost 300 times greater in developing nations than in developed regions. Climate-related health 
risks are also often greater for poor individuals within any population, who often lack adequate 
shelter or access to health and other critical services, and for population groups with specific 
vulnerabilities. In the 1991 cyclone disasters that killed 140,000 people in Bangladesh, death rates 
among women were almost four times greater than those among men: rates among children under 
10 years of age were more than six times greater than those of older children.  WHO’s estimates of 
the per capita impacts of climate change are many times greater in regions that already had the 
greatest disease burden, and amongst children compared to adults. The ongoing process of climate 
change is likely to widen the existing health disparities between the richest and the poorest 
populations. 
 
The example provided above illustrates clearly how climate change acts as a significant obstacle in 
ensuring the progressive realisation of the right to health as defined in both WHO’s Constitution, as 
well as the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)6 and a 
range of other international and regional human rights treaties.  A key characteristic of the right to 
health lies in its emphasis not just on the provision of health care but also on the underlying 
determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an 
adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, as well as healthy occupational and 
environmental conditions7 – factors that are uniquely susceptible to the effects of climate change. 
 
The effect of climate change not only undermines States’ abilities to ensure these services, but its 
consequences also divert precious and often limited resources, hampering States’ abilities to 
strengthen broader and longer-term investment in health. Nevertheless due to the efforts of 
countless health experts around the world we also have a good idea about what action has to be 
taken, first and foremost by States themselves as the primary duty-bearers, to make them resilient to 
climate change.8 The first are actions to strengthen health systems and to adapt to climate change.9 
They include, for example, investments in surveillance and response for climate-sensitive infectious 
diseases, strengthening of health system preparedness for extreme weather events, and ensuring 
climate resilience of critical services, such as water supply and sanitation.  The second are actions to 
simultaneously promote health at the same time as cutting emissions of the greenhouse gases that 
are driving climate change. The most direct connection is with air pollution, which causes over 
seven million deaths every year. Promoting cleaner sources of energy for household use and 
                                                                                                                                                            
L.L., (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, (the 
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
United Kingdom, and New York, NY, USA (2015). 
5. Patz, J.A., Campbell-Lendrum, D., Holloway, T., and Foley, J.A., “Impact of regional climate change on human 
health,” 438 Nature 310 (17 November 2005). 
6. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Art. xx. (1966). 
Available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm. 
7. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health, UN Doc. No. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000). Available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/40d009901358b0e2c1256915005090be?Opendocument. 
8. World Health Organization, “WHO Climate and Health Country Profiles – Global Overview” (forthcoming in 
November 2015). 
9. World Health Organization, “Operational Framework for Building Climate-Resilient Health Systems ”. (2015) .  
WHO, Geneva, Switzerland. Available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/189951/1/9789241565073_eng.pdf . 
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electricity generation, and more sustainable urban transport solutions, for example, are both human 
development priorities, but also contribute to slowing climate change, and reducing air pollution 
deaths10. These actions will need to be taken by States, but international organisations like the 
WHO can play an important role in providing a wide range of assistance.  
 
WHO AS A FORUM FOR ACTION ON HEALTH AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
It is agreed within the United Nations family that the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the principal forum for the global action that is needed to address 
climate change. While acknowledging this important consensus within the UN system this 
agreement does not preclude other United Nations bodies from playing a role in relation to climate 
change. In the past the UNFCCC Secretariat has welcomed the expert contribution of WHO, 
including throughout the treaty processes.  
 
Just as WHO acknowledges the priority of the UNFCCC for negotiating global climate action, we 
also recognise our responsibility as the pre-eminent forum for the discussion of questions of global 
public health challenges. For this reason, for the better part of the past decade, the item of climate 
change and health has appeared on the agenda of WHO’s governing bodies. And even when it was 
not, such as at this last World Health Assembly in May 2015, both States and civil society have 
drawn attention to it.  
 
Not only does climate change pose one of the most significant challenges to global health that we 
face today, but WHO’s expertise is also vital to the efforts to address climate change through global 
action. This is evident from the contributions that WHO has made to the interim and annual 
meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC and by the number of requests from 
States for cooperation and technical advice on the relationship between climate change and health 
that the organisations has received. For example, WHO’s contribution to the UNFCCC climate talks 
in Bonn, Germany, in June 2015, emphasized that “[a]n effective new universal climate change 
agreement must also be very much an effective public health agreement, and health ministers and 
practitioners need to speak up to make that clear as countries shape the final outcome, which will be 
concluded in Paris, in December.”11 
 
While WHO is supporting efforts to achieve an effective global strategy to deal with climate 
change, it is also working on the ground in and with affected countries. An example is its ongoing 
project to address the risks of climate change on water-borne diseases in Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Ethiopia and Tanzania that aims to heighten awareness of important stakeholders along with 
coherence between climate, health, and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) policies; to 
strengthen the climate resilience of WASH services, and to assess the effectiveness of community 
and household interventions in strengthening health resilience to climate change.  This will be used 
as a basis for guiding and “climate-proofing” the large-scale investments that are now being made 
in WASH, to ensure that they also protect population health from climate risks.12 
 
Raising awareness of climate and health connections: 
 
WHO’s Member States have requested to work with partners to raise awareness of the links 
between climate change and health.  In August 2014, hosted the first WHO global conference on 
Health and Climate, drawing approximately 400 participants from 96 countries.  This included 25 
                                                
10. See, for example, WHO, Reducing Global Health Risks Through Mitigation of Short-Lived Pollutants. Scoping 
Report for Policy-makers, (2015) WHO: Geneva, Switzerland  
11. Note of the meeting (see http://www.who.int/globalchange/mediacentre/news/climate-change/en/). 
12. This project is funded by the International Climate Facility of the United Kingdom. 
http://www.who.int/globalchange/projects/wash/en/ (accessed 18 September 2015). 
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government ministers, heads and senior staff from UN agencies and other intergovernmental 
organisations, as well as experts, practitioners and civil society representatives from the fields of 
health, climate change and sustainable development. In response to the very strong scientific 
evidence of the health risks presented by climate change, the participants gave a clear warning; that 
without adequate mitigation and adaptation, climate change poses unacceptable risks to global 
public health. The conference supported stronger engagement by the global health community, to 
ensure that public health concerns are reflected in upcoming international climate and development 
discussions, and national adaptation and mitigation policies.  Participants affirmed the critical 
importance of strategies to reduce health impacts from climate change already occurring – as well 
as realising potential health benefits from measures to mitigate climate change, particularly through 
reductions in death and disease caused by air pollution.  As a follow up to the conference, WHO is 
mobilising the voices of the global public health community behind a strong and effective climate 
change agreement at the UN climate conference in Paris in December 2015. 
 
At the global level WHO is currently engaged, in partnership with the UNFCCC Secretariat in 
providing quantitative and narrative data profiling the impact of climate change on the health of 
each of our 194 Member States. These profiles will highlight the climate hazards each State faces, 
the current and expected impacts of the adverse effects of climate change and air-pollution as well 
as opportunities for health gains from adequate mitigation and adaptation activities. They will also 
describe the status of responses by each State. 
 
The activities that States and their partners are taking to address the effects of climate change on 
their populations, of which the health consequences are perhaps the most serious and most costly, 
require resources. In this respect the pledges by developed countries of US$100 billion per year by 
2020 are a welcome start. But these pledges are likely already too little, and may be too late, for 
many. Resources to allow all States to take the needed adaptation and mitigation action to protect 
their people, all people everywhere, from the adverse effects of climate change need to be 
mobilized today. We have seen this happen in relation to child health where States have mobilised 
the resources to halve child mortality in a decade and a half. We need an urgent mobilisation of 
funds to address climate change impacts, many of which will significantly impact health for all.   
 
Elements of An Agenda for Action on Health and Climate Change 
 
In light of the brief description of the problem and some of the forums making an effort to address 
it, it is possible to suggest a few elements for agenda for action on health in the context of climate 
change. These actions would support a rights-based response that is rooted in greater accountability 
mechanisms, enshrined in the UNFCCC, and leveraged through more inclusive participation – as 
reflected in the global conference on climate change and health convened by WHO. 
  
First, there is a need to ensure that health is made a priority within the context of reacting to climate 
change. This requires not only support for efforts for research, but also the commitment to address 
the health consequences of climate change in political and legal documents such as the Paris 
Agreement and the decisions of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC that will implement 
the Agreement. It would be particularly important for the Paris Agreement to include a reference to 
the need to address health consequences in provisions on adaptation. Making health a priority 
requires mobilising of adequate resources to address the consequences to the health of all, but 
especially in line with a rights-based approach – for the most vulnerable, that are due to climate 
change. In this respect more attention is needed to ensure that the Green Climate Fund and other 
similar funds are in a position to provide adequate resources for the significant efforts that 
governments will have to make to ensure the health of their people despite the challenges posed by 
climate change. The Lancet Commission on health and climate change mentioned “[s]cale-up 
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financing for climate resilient health systems world-wide”13 as one of its priority recommendations 
to governments over the next five years. While pledges have been made the resources have yet to 
materialise when they are already needed.  
 
Second, we need to set and begin to implement action agendas. Respecting the precautionary 
principle that is enshrined in article 3 of the UNFCCC, we need to start now, and not wait. The 
precautionary principle requires that we act based on perceived threats to health that climate change 
poses even if we are not yet sure that they will materialise. The WHO has been acting by providing 
information on the effects of climate change on health and by providing technical assistance to our 
Member States. At its 136th Executive Board Session in January 2015, Member States approved the 
elements of the workplan presented by the WHO Secretariat up to 2019. This outlines how WHO 
will work to support government efforts to address the adverse effects of climate change on health; 
from raising awareness, to developing partnerships that address the diverse range of connections 
between climate change and health, to guiding research, and supporting implementation. While our 
Member States bear the main responsibilities for protecting the health of their populations from the 
adverse effects of climate change, WHO will ensure that it is fit to support government efforts and 
to provide the information governments need to take the best action possible.         
 
Third, and related to the two above suggestions, there is a clear need to see the synergies between 
different sectoral approaches. For example, overall poverty reduction, as well as investments in key 
sectors such as nutrition and WASH, contribute to resilience, including the ability for people to 
withstand the shocks and disease exposure to which the adverse effects of climate change 
contribute. Assessing the health implications of decisions in sectors such as household energy, 
electricity production, and transport, can help to identify opportunities to simultaneously reduce 
carbon emissions, improve health, and increase economic efficiency. Health Ministries, health 
professionals, and the WHO need to be prepared to respond to the connections between climate 
change and health as multifaceted issues that require coordination, cooperation, and above all a 
concerted will by all concerned to address these challenges. 
 
These are just three basic elements of agenda for global action to address the health consequences 
of climate change. Many more specific elements will emerge as we face this global challenge, but if 
these three commitments are in place we will all be well-placed to ensure the goal of the WHO 
Constitution and the right to health, which is to ensure the highest level of mental and physical 
health for all.     
 
Climate change will have a profound impact on the health of the most vulnerable for a long time to 
come. At the same time that it presents the international community with a tremendous challenge, it 
also offers a unique opportunity for governments to cooperate together. Today the international 
community has an opportunity to take steps that will ensure healthy populations for generations to 
come. We know many of the interventions that are needed, but also need to make them priorities if 
we are to make them realities.     
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